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United States policy toward the Federal Republic of
Mexico has undergone serious changes over the past decade.
The recent rise in interest in Mexico by U.S. authorities
has been prompted by the discovery of substantial hydrocar-
bon deposits in Mexico.
Historically Mexico has stood out from most developing
nations in the positive sense due to its size, population,
government stability, and rapid economic growth. Recently
however, the country's high foreign debt has created a
dangerous economic crisis with possible repercussions for
U.S. -Mexican relations.
The United States hopes to benefit from the petroleum
surpluses in Mexico, but in addition to the current Mexican
economic crisis, a host of historic and current problems
complicate the bilateral relationship between the two nations,
not the least being a large immigration (sometimes illegal)
from Mexico. Additionally, the differences in the solution
to regional problems (Central America) and the fact that
Mexico is highly nationalistic and suspicious of U.S.
initiatives or proposals aggravate the problem.
This study focuses on United States national security
interests in Mexico, discusses the history of U.S. -Mexican
relations and illuminates the most complex problems which




II. DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The active pursuit of global interests by the United
States is a relatively recent development. The keynote of
the foreign policy of the United States was sounded by
George Washington in the memorable proclamation of neutrality
of 1793; "The new nation must not have part in the political
broils of Europe. The great ocean has isolated us—why
2forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation." Prior
to WWII, with the exception of the Spanish American War and
the interruption of WWI, the United States was a nation
protected in isolation by its bordering oceans.
A dramatic enlargement of the international environment
was precipitated by the massive destruction of WWII, the
rolling back of the European colonial powers from their
traditional paternalistic roles, and the emergence of the
Soviet Union as an expansionist power determined to dominate
the world.
The outcome of WWII saw the United States emerge with an
undisputed edge in industrial capabilities and a fairly
strong economy automatically thrusting it into a position of
free-world leadership and extensive foreign policy. A
leadership role which over the past 25 years has been ques-
tioned not only by those who share its basic principles,
but also by those who are the main resource of the United
States, its citizens.

Any discussion of foreign policy or of U.S. interests
in another country must ultimately deal with the perennial
perplexity of defining the national interest. Without
exception, every study that attempts to evaluate past foreign
policy or to recommend a correct course to follow, is founded
upon a particular definition of the national interest. There
are many areas of doubt about and criticism of the concept
of national interest. Many scholars argue that the concept
is too broad, too vague and too all-inclusive. Others have
argued that in a pluralistic society such as that of the
United States containing a mixture of interests such as
racial, ethnic, religious, economic, professional and ideo-
logical, it is impossible to determine such a perplexing
problem.
Various scholars have proposed a variety of formulations
of the national interest in terms of its functional components
James Rosenau, in his article, "National Interest," states,
that there are two schools of thought regarding the defini-
3tion of national interests. The "Objectivists" are concerned
with the "worth" of a nation's foreign policy in terms of
objective reality. According to this approach, the mere
process of describing the reality of a situation will make
apparent what the rational course of action should be, i.e.,
the national interest is assumed to be self-evident in the




The subjectivists on the other hand, are more concerned
with explaining why a situation exists, and attempting to
interpret the values and aspirations of the people in their
formulation of a solution to the problem. According to
this line of argument, the national interest is whatever
the nation's leaders seek to preserve and enhance. The
leaders in turn attempt to reflect the aspirations of the
people in their furtherance of the national interest.
The objectivists have a problem in that because goals
and interests are value-laden, men differ on what consti-
tutes the "self-evident" goals of a nation. The subjectivists
must deal with the fact that the different groups have
differing concepts of what action and policies are best.
More specifically, the resulting conflict of interests may
cloud the issue and make it difficult for leaders to deter-
mine what the people want. Clearly situations are never so
well defined that the best option is obvious and agreeable
to all. Nor are situations always going to generate sober
analysis and clear-cut expression of choice by the people.
Along these lines Walter Lippman has argued that a loss
of a "public philosophy" has occurred in recent years.
Lippman believes that the liberal democracies of the West
are in decline, a decline which started in 1917 when the
stress and exhaustion of the war caused many democracies to
be influenced by their publics, and this led them to lose
authority by including the emotional public in the execution
11

of policy. Lippman contends that the resulting increase
in public involvement changed the role of elected officials
from that of being elected to make wise decisions for all,
to that of being elected as a mouthpiece for their
constituencies
.
Lippman states that public opinions should not be ig-
nored, but that they should be treated for what they are and
not necessarily as propositions in the public interest.
He believes that the people should let professionals govern
since that is what they are elected to do.
Strategic and diplomatic decisions require a kind
of knowledge, experience, and seasoned judgement
that cannot be gleaned from reading newspapers,
reading a few books, and attending occasional lectures.
In short, Lippman believes that the democracies are in
decline because the power of the executive has become "enfeebled,
often to the verge of impotence, by the pressures of the
representative assemblies and of mass opinions."
Taking a slightly different approach, Martin E. Goldstein,
contends that the primary objectives of U.S. Foreign Policy
is national security. Consequently, criteria must be estab-
lised as to which portions of the globe must be defended in
a conventional military manner. For the U.S., according to
Goldstein, the portion of the globe that is critical to
4
U.S. security includes Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean area.
To assist decision makers in deciding which areas of the globe
must be kept friendly and out of the threat of aggression by
12

unfriendly powers due to National Interests, he has estab-
lished nine fundamental and logical indicators. These are:
1. Geographic proximity so that friendly nations are on
the periphery;
2. Strategic location including control over external
lands, waterways, and geographic configurations;
3. Sources of scarce and vital resources;
4. External economic markets;
5. Supplies of scarce and vital finished goods;
6. Repositories of the country's private investment;
7. Friendly countries with influence potential based
on population;
8. Friendly countries with a highly industrialized level
of economy;
9. Friendly countries with military power.
One difficulty with this framework is however obviously the
fact that the relative importance of each item is not clearly
specified.
Donald E. Nuechterlein, who has made a significant effort,
towards the stringent analysis on national interests, uses a
taxonomy of four basic U.S. interests: (Defense) the protec-
tion of the state from external and internal threats:
(Economic) general enhancement of the well being of the
state and its populace: (World Order) protection of the state
in its position in world politics and its populace: and
(Ideological) the protection and continuation of a set of
13

values which the state holds as its own. He defines the
national interest as "the perceived needs and desires of one
sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states which
constitute its external environment."
Nuechterlein qualifies three major implications of his
definition: (1) that decisions about the national interest
are the result of a political process in which the leaders
ultimately decide the importance of an event or crisis to
the national interest; (2) that such decisions differentiate
between the public interest as it relates to the internal
environment (and the national interest as it relates to the
external environment); and (3) finally his definition implies
that the interests apply to the nation in its entirety rather
than the interests of private groups, bureaucratic entities
or political organizations within the state. Because it can
be operationalized, Nuechterlein ' s "world order" interest
will be combined in this study with the "defense" interest
and aspects of "economic" interests as one broad category
of United States Security Interests.
As one can gather from the previous discussion, the
literature dealing with the national interest is somewhat
limited and often resorts to criticsm of the writings of
others without offering substantially better ideas on the
subject. If the national concept is to be useful to diplo-
mats and other foreign policy makers in the future, we must
recognize that states do not have a single national interest,
14

but many interests which are determined through the political
process of their respective system.
The foregoing thoughts and complexities in the concept
of the national interest added to the forthcoming section,
will hopefully facilitate the process of foreign policy
analysis and result in more realistic decisions by our policy
makers in the interest of National Security.
A. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING
Prior to setting out on a course to determine a nation's
foreign policy, it is necessary to examine the interests that
its policies are pursuing and willing to secure.
Different ideas, methods and resources available, are
what makes a government's decisions political. Often indi-
viduals and interest groups will attempt to maximize their
desires by voicing dissatisfaction thereby attempting through
this dissatisfaction at placing a leverage on government
decisions. Within this sphere of limited resources and
standards of social acceptability, one group's maximum
satisfaction is another group's maximum dissatisfaction. Such
a discrepancy leads to conflict.
It is one of the tasks of our leaders in the nation's
capital to satisfy the largest possible number of these
interests. But it is also a fact of politics that not every
interest can be satisfied. Robert Osgood put it this way:
"National Interest is understood to mean a state of affairs
7
valued solely for its benefit to the nation."
15

The guiding principles of the constitution can be seen
as implying three requirements on the conduct of United States
foreign policy in order that it be in the national interest:
First, it must promote national security, "the defense
of internal values against external threats." As Donald E.
Nuechterlein, Hans J. Morgenthau, Morton H. Halperin and
Martin E. Goldstein would conclude, the fundamental goal of
U.S. foreign policy must be the avoidance of those actions
which could threaten the posterity of the U.S. or its way of
life. This requires, however unpleasant the prospect, un-
flagging attention to national power and international power
9
relationships in all their complex forms.
Secondly, U.S. foreign policy must strive continuously
to create an international political and economic environ-
ment conducive to the enhancement of United States economic
and physical welfare. The "economic and physical welfare"
of the United States encompasses a myriad of objectives
and problems, internal and external, such as economic growth,
population, inflation, unemployment, health, food, water and
water sharing, ocean and mineral rights, energy and immigra-
tion, just to name a few. It is dilemmas of this nature which
will require a substantial amount of debate over the long
run, and in the short run demand certain unpopular decisions
and sacrifices in economic welfare for the physical well
being of the nation.
In today's world of conflict, interdependency and compe-
tition, we cannot limit ourselves to think of these problems
16

as domestic, but must realize that changes in the international
environment can place in retrograde the best of domestic pro-
grams. Each nation is committed to promoting its own inter-
ests by persuading other international actors to behave in
a fashion that is compatible with the needs of others. The
United States finds itself, therefore, committed to forums
and agencies pursuing the cooperative and peaceful management
of the international problems of economic and physical
welfare.
The third requirement imposed upon United States foreign
policy is that it must be conducted in such a form as to
uphold and defend the democratic principles upon which the
nation was founded and in which its founding fathers believed.
It is from this requirement where the ideological interests
category of Nuechterlein, for the protection and furtherance
of a set of values that the citizens of a nation-state share
and believe to be universally good, are derived.
It can be said that ideological interests, which are
value-laden impose major constraints on the formulation and
execution of United States foreign policy, which in theory
at least should reflect all U.S. interests. The most signi-
ficant constraint, is that the Executive Branch does not
have a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. Congress,
in particular, but also the judicial branch and public opinion
have a part in policy formulation.
Measuring the magnitude of specific United States inter-
ests in another country and assigning priorities to those
17

interests are by far the most difficult problems in using
the national interest approach in designing or analyzing
foreign policy. It is relatively easy to establish a scheme
for stating the level of U.S. interests as Nuechterlein has
done with his four intensities of interest. While such a
scheme does place clearly stated levels of interest, it can-
not however eliminate the subjective judgement required to
assign a particular level. Additionally, such a scheme
inevitably tends to treat any specific issue as autonomous,
when in fact most interests are interrelated with other
interests
.
If the concept of the national interest is so diverse,
so nebulous and so elusive as to defy scholarly attempts to
operationalize its definition, how then can those elected
to decision making positions know for certain that the foreign
policy they will choose will accurately represent the multiple
dreams and aims of this society. The final judge, then, is
the decision maker. In adhering to J. Roland Pennock's thesis
of "precise policy based on experience, continuing contact
with special interests, and freedom to pursue the national
interest as they come to see it, " the decision makers
actual goal is to provide for the nation the resources to
achieve those interests as he comes to see them.
Though a definition of the national interest may not be
available, a working concept remains necessary (until at
least some other vehicle may be found which can form the
18

basis for foreign policy)
. If the national interest cannot
be precisely defined, the vehicle through which the decision
maker can move from the attainment of an unambiguous measure
of national interest to the formulation of foreign policy
is the pragmatic one of achieving what appears to be optimal
at the time (again given no unambiguous measure of the national
interest)
.
A distinction must be drawn between national
interests and the circumstances of time and place which
determine the actual policies pursued.
B. UNITED STATES ROLE
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie once said "There is no
lack of rhetoric calling for more American leadership in
the world—leadership we must continue to provide. But if
we are to continue to lead then we must be prepared to pay
12the costs that leadership requires."
This is a role which the U.S. must continue to pursue
especially in those regions where the costs are presently
relatively low compared to what they would be if uncontrolled
destabilization and turmoil were to become deeply rooted.
The United States is however, constrained as to how it goes
about portraying this leadership role. The days of the
"Cold War" are gone. The attempt at reawakening of awareness
of East-West issues in the wake of Soviet-Cuban support for
revolutionary governments in Latin America, has not altered
the "de-facto" character of the international system.
19

The United States can no longer act as a command figure
and become directly involved in the affairs of other sover-
eign nations. Mistrust of past administrations and policies
has led Third World nations to reject the United States for
fear of dependence and of any possible U.S. claims vis-a-vis
their internal affairs. United States Government administra-
tions have been experiencing how quickly the U.S. public tires
of the burdens of a rule such as "world policeman." This does
not imply however, that the U.S. should retire into an iso-
lationist mode, and let the world mend their own problems.
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under-Secretary of State for Politi-
cal Affairs, described it as follows in a speech in April
1981:
First, we have recognized that, beyond simply
asserting our role as leaders of the free world, we
must act as leaders. Responsible American leader-
ship is of the utmost importance in achieving our aim
of a just and stable world order. We must be strong,
balanced, consistent and reliable in our policies and
our actions and we must proceed with prudence and
sensitivity with regard to the interests of our
allies and friends, consulting fully with them as we
work together for the more secure and prosperous world
we all desire. 13
To maintain its lead the U.S. must change its image by
employing initiative, cooperation through consultation and
perseverance. Initiative, because the world is in dire need
of leadership today more than ever before. The magnitude of
independent nations and those acquiring independence has
never been greater. Not all of these nations can perceive
the complexity of the many international problems facing
mans existence and no other nation has the broad range of
20

capabilities and interests to deal within the international
arena. The costs of leadership are enormous, and has become
a role in which the United States has been thrust and there
is no turning back. The dilemma then becomes how to best
fulfill that leadership role.
Cooperation (when asked for) and consultation have been
an effective tool in United States foreign policy. Consul-
tation has two forms: bilateral consultations with our
friends and allies, and multilateral consultations in the
various international organizations and agencies. Consul-
tation is the key to avoiding the "Hegemonic" image of leader-
ship which grinds against the nationalistic views of other
nations. Unilateral actions on the part of the U.S. are not
condoned, when these decisions impact on others.
Because the effort must be put forth in a sometimes chaotic
international system, the U.S. has had to develop both perse-
verance, meaning patient but continuous dedication to
initiative, and cooperation/consultation (because of the
magnitude of the worldwide problems) . The United States was
thrust in the leadership role after WWII, which has at times
been a thankless job. The pay-off of this role however lies
in the preservation and continuation of the national interest.
Long accustomed to its status as a world power, many in
the United States tend to assign to their neighbors in the
Western Hemisphere a minor share of attention in matters
of foreign policy. Since the discovery in 1976 of major
hydrocarbon deposits in Mexico, greater attention has been
21

focused on U.S. -Mexican relations. Although Mexico's future
oil production decisions will have important consequences for
the United States, it would be a mistake to focus only on
the importance of energy for ties between both nations. This
view alone would provide credibility and support the thesis
that the U.S. pays attention to its southern neighbors only
in times of interest.
Today there are other economic, noneconomic, and regional
differences which have long existed between both nations (but
have become much more alarming) threatening bilateral rela-
tions. The way in which these and other linkages are handled
through diplomatic channels is likely to affect the evolution
of U.S. -Mexican relations.
The stakes include much more than oil and extend to
affecting the people of both nations. Mexico is not just
another oil-producing country, and the U.S. needs to recognize
the fact that even if oil did not exist, it would still be
important because of the other factors mentioned in this study,
which affect bilateral relations.
The issues are complex and there are many different per-
ceptions and perspectives on how to best deal with them.
Unless these perceptions and perspectives are taken into
account when formulating U.S. policies, the national inter-
est will not be well served.
22

III. UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Mexico and the United States find themselves in an inesca-
pable and complicated relationship that is a result of their
geography. Over the years the relationship has been molded
in the crucible of a shared history that has not been without
its traumatizing effects. The perceptions that have been
colored by history are sharpened by differences and dispari-
ties separating the two nations. Octavio Paz, a Mexican poet
and essayist, defines these dissimilarities as "development
and underdevelopment, wealth and poverty, power and weakness
14
and domination and dependence."
It is obvious that both nations do not have a marriage
made in heaven. But, the reality is that they are continental
neighbors, and do share benefits and disabilities as well as
problems and opportunities. It is an unavoidable and neces-
sary close relationship, for as Mr. Paz expressed it, "our
countries are neighbors condemned to live alongside each
other.
"
The relationship began even before the two nations existed
as such. It was born of a clash of cultures and of imperial
systems, and included an admisture of bigotry, greed and
racism. By the eighteenth century, Spain directed a great
deal of its activity toward strengthening the northern fron-
tier of New Spain (that region that was to become Mexico)
23

politically and militarily against the intrusion of Anglo-
Saxons and other foreign rivals.
The American revolution for independence, together with
the French Revolution, served as an inspiration for Mexico and
other Spanish Colonies. The American movement was the first
to break the chain of colonial ties with European empires,
and its statesmen offered exciting new political concepts
such as republicanism and federalism. Rebels in New Spain
looked to the United States for assistance, but aside from
the fact that the United States was the first to recognize
Mexican independence, there was little U.S. support.
The winning of the American West came largely at the ex-
pense of Mexico. Just as the U.S. was starting out on its
energetic course of westward expansion, Mexico was suffering
disorder and dissent. Mexico's struggle for independence from
Spain erupted in 1810 and culminated in 1921, leaving Mexico
a sovereign republic, but Mexican society a total wreck.
The once-thriving economy was now unproductive, the political
system was in disarray and the country became a paradise for
ambitious ex-generals from the wars of independence, who
continuously struggled for power.
The United States took full advantage of this situation.
In 1823 the United States issued a far-reaching declaration
of policy known as the Monroe Doctrine, warning the European
powers that any attempt to extend their monarchical system
to this hemisphere would be considered a threat to the peace
and security of the United States.
24

The doctrine seemed to promise an alliance in the event
that Spain sought to reconquer its former colonies, but Mexico
was more cautious than positive. Since the Monroe Doctrine
had been manifested unilaterally, without consultation with
any Latin American country, it caused much concern. In time
the doctrine would become mixed with U.S. expansionism and
imperialism and would be viewed as a cover for U.S hegemony
within the hemisphere. However, before such concerns and
fears were given substance by events, a second reason for
doubt became apparent. The United States soon demonstrated
that it alone would determine when the doctrine was applica-
ble, and other nations could not request its enforcement.
Spain invaded Mexico in 1829 in an attempt at reconquest, and
nine years later the French invaded Veracruz in an effort at
debt collection. In both situations, the United States did
1 6
not put the doctrine into effect.
During the second quarter of the nineteenth century,
Mexico experienced U.S. westward expansionism and manifest
destiny firsthand. Sensing that the United States posed a
threat, Mexican leaders attempted to strengthen their terri-
torial hold by permitting colonists to settle in the north-
eastern province known today as Texas, then a largely
unpopulated wilderness. Despite these colonists agreement
to accept Mexican citizenship, they soon began chaffing under
Mexican rule, and in 1836 they declared their independence.
In 1837 the United States recognized Texas as a sovereign
polity and in 1845, annexed the state of Texas.
25

While North Americans claimed that the southern border of
Texas extended to the Rio Grande, Mexicans insisted that it
should end at the Nueces River (see map) . In 184 6 United
States President James K. Polk dispatched troops under General
Zachary Taylor to the disputed area whereby the war between
the U.S. and Mexico began, ending in 194 8 with the signing
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. As a result of this
treaty, Mexico was obliged to surrender a huge span of land
from New Mexico to California, more than a million square
miles, in exchange for fifteen million dollars. It was not
but a few years later that the United States extended its
acquisition, by obtaining an additional corner of New Mexico
and Arizona through the Gadsden Purchase (see map, page 27) .
A. THE PORFIRIATO ERA
Relations between the two countries improved markedly
during the final quarter of the 19th century and first decade
of the 20th century. Mexico found peace and material progress
in the reign of more than thirty years of Porfirio Diaz, who
stabilized Mexico and began an economic modernization of the
country. Foreign capital, particularly American capital,
made a significant contribution to the Diaz modernizing proc-
ess. Mexico's economic dependence on the United States
dates from the 1880* s and has increased or decreased in dif-
ferent periods since then rather than showing a continuous
development in one area. This trend is relevant even today
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of weakness which has created a mistrust of the U.S., for
fear of being dominated by its strong northern neighbor.
Although the Porfiriato Era was economically good for
the U.S., for the mass of the Mexican people it added the
burden of an exploitative foreign capitalism to that of an
17expanded agrarian feudalism. The beneficiaries of this
period were foreigners and a small Mexican elite (very repre-
sentative throughout Latin America) . Mexico became known as
the "mother of foreigners and the step-mother of Mexicans."
It is no wonder that when popular discontent welled up in
the Mexican revolution, beginning in 1910, the movement
was strongly nationalistic, particularly in relation to
foreign capitalists.
American ties to Diaz eventually had their price, and
in 1911 after 35 years of autocratic rule, the Porfiriato
was toppled by an insurgency which grew into the Mexican
Revolution which lasted from 1910-1917. A multifaceted and
sometimes confusing movement that gave expression in one
form or another to the heartfelt aspirations of the masses.
The Mexican people rebelled against a dictatorship, against
institutions that had persisted since Spanish colonialism,
and against the economic colonialism that Mexico had welcomed
for more than three decades in the names of peace and progress
B. UNITED STATES INTERVENTION
Although the United States was sympathetic with the
democratic aspirations of Francisco I. Madero , initiator
28

of the Mexican Revolution, and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
refused to recognize General Victoriano Huertas counterrevo-
lutionary regime which had overthrown and destroyed Madero,
the turbulent decade of the revolution sorely tested U.S.-
Mexican relations. There were neutrality violations, arms
shipments and innocent victims of battle near border towns.
To protect American lives and property or defend national
honor President Woodrow Wilson's strong reaction to the
19arrest of some United States sailors in Tampico, organized
troops, moved warships into Mexican waters and organized
raids by U.S. Marines, thereby occupying VeraCruz in 1914
20in what has been called an "affair of honor." The with-
drawal of U.S. troops came in 1917 and this same year marked
the ratification of the Mexican constitution, the most
sacrosanct document of the Mexican Revolution.
Ultimately, the United States gave its support to the
faction that triumphed in the revolution, but not without
seeking to nullify some radical provisions of the constitu-
tion, especially the assertion of state authority over sub-
soil rights, Article 27, a clause which meant that the
government could nationalize foreign-controlled oil properties,
many of which were held by U.S. companies.
U.S. concern about the effect of these constitutional
provisions on property rights foreshadowed the difficulties
of the 19 20 's. The decade brought about much debate and
threats of intervention as the United States sought a basis
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for settling claims arising from the implementation of the
agrarian and petroleum laws and from the suspension of pay-
ments of Mexican bonded and railroad indebtedness. 21 These
issues and most particularly the petroleum question, brought
tension, confrontation and new conflict. In 1938, the issue
of petroleum rose again when British and American oil com-
panies defied the Mexican government, thereby causing the
recapture of a precious national resource from foreign con-
trol. Oil had now been nationalized. This time, however,
the Good Neighbor Policy of the Roosevelt administration,
and the approaching World War II foreshadowed any disparities
between both nations. Additionally, in contrast to its
stance in World War I, Mexico joined in hemispheric defense
measures, and after Pearl Harbor declared war on the axis.
C. WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT
The cleared atmosphere in U.S. -Mexican relations during
the late 1930' s and early 1940' s made possible close collabora-
tion during the war. Mexico did not participate as such in
the war, but contributed strategic raw materials, agricul-
tural production and thousands of workers who helped meet
U.S. labor shortages caused by the manpower demands of the
war. In return, the U.S. helped with the renovation and
modernization of Mexico's railroad systems, stabilization
of its currency and in the settlement of outstanding claims
with the U.S. government and oil companies.
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The legacy of North American behavior from 1820-19 20
lives vividly in Mexico today, and deeply influences its
bilateral relations with the United States. Mexicans look
back on that period of U.S. action as an unremitting effort
to determine the course of Mexico's destiny by force and
diplomacy. Not only did the U.S. seize half of the nation,
but it also attempted to manipulate its internal politics and
undermine the greatest revolutionary movement in the country's
history. Given this history of armed intervention and economic
and sometimes cultural penetration, it is not surprising that
Mexican attitudes towards the United States are characterized
by fear, resentment and frustration.
U.S. -Mexican relations did enter a new phase since the
Mexican Revolution ended in 19 20. No longer does the U.S.
attempt to conquer Mexican territory or unseat elected offi-
cials. The U.S. has begun to realize that adjusting to
Mexico's increasing strength, stability and respect in the
hemisphere and beyond, is to its best interest. However,
the period since the revolution has not been without its
friction and controversies. Neighbors are bound to have
problems, and in this case the problems have stemmed as a
result of a geographical common border. Problems of water
sharing, population, drug traffic, economics, politics,
immigration and the disparity between a rich and poor nation
increase this potential.
The political issues of today and tomorrow are mainly
socioeconomic in origin. At present the major concerns fall
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under three very complex headings: (1) trade and invest-
ment; (2) migration; and (3) energy. Each set of issues has
a history of its own and in order to establish a basis for
acceptable solutions, each one will need to be examined
in relationship to one another. In contemporary times,




IV. MEXICO'S TRADE AND ITS ECONOMY
In economic relations with the United States, Mexico
faces a constant dilemma. On the one hand Mexico stands in
need of U.S. trade and investment in order to obtain desir-
able levels of growth, on the other, Mexico fears any form
of dependency which would restrict control of its economy.
Economic sovereignty is an enduring legacy of the Mexican
Revolution, and it is imperative for each administration to
demonstrate a continuing commitment to the independence of
the national economy against real or potential advancement
by the United States.
The year 19 7 8 represented the commencement of a period
of rapid economic growth for Mexico's economy. Due to
rising oil revenues, foreign loans and investments, and
resting upon the political stability provided by successive
administrations of the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) , investment consumption and income began rising at
fast and impressive rates. By the early 19 80's, the growth
process began encountering problems. A high and rising
inflation, a low and declining productivity in all sectors,
structural imbalances in most labor markets, and catastrophic
rural emigration were but a few of the problems that cul-
minated in a major economic crisis beginning in February
19 82 which threatened to slow down or even stop the process of
22
economic growth for the forseeable future.
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Ironically, the spark that ignited the financial panic
in early August 1982 was an austerity measure. 23 After a
sound election victory in July for the official government
party, the PRI
, on August 1 the government decreed price in-
creases of 100 percent on bread and tortilla and 50 percent
on gasoline to reduce budget deficits caused by subsidies
for these same items. Anti-inflationary in the long run,
these measures meant short run corrective inflation. More
significantly, they provoked the public, already shocked by
a 60 percent annual inflation rate frantically to convert
pesos to dollars. With sharply declining foreign exchange
reserves the government declared domestic dollar deposits
in banks redeemable only in pesos, instituted a dual exchange
rate, and temporarily closed the exchange market.
The demoralization of the private sector, the prevailing
impoverishment of large numbers of unemployed, and the
dangerous political disaffection pose very difficult problems
for those presently responsible for formulating governmental
policies. The orthodox prescription being offered by the
International Monetary Fund (MF) , could become politically
painful medicine. On November 10, 19 82, the Mexican govern-
ment announced it had reached a long awaited agreement with
the IMF on an austerity program designed at easing the crisis
caused by the nation's $80 billion foreign debt, the highest
of all nations. Under the agreement Mexico would receive
$3.84 billion worth of credit from the I.M.F. over the next
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three years, but the government must drastically reduce its
deficit, raise taxes, and curb imports to qualify for the
fund.
To the extent that one can judge from published articles
and interviews, the new policies emerging under the leader-
ship of President Miguel de la Madrid appear to emphasize
restoration of financial stability and domestic investor
confidence as well as agricultural development and promotion
25
of exports. Additionally he has committed himself to a
"moral renovation," a fight against the profound cultural
2 fiproblem of corruption. Whether this reflects a new long-
term strategy or merely an expedient attempt to qualify for
necessary additional credits, is yet to be seen.
Economics is definitely an important aspect of U.S.-
Mexican relations. In what ways economic relations between
both nations will be affected by any new development strategy
being formulated by Mexican authorities remains speculative.
A. MEXICO'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
For most developing countries, rising energy prices
are not likely to pose any new problems per se, but rather,
they are likely to exacerbate existing ones— increased external
debt, etc. Industrialized countries on the other hand rely
heavily on oil imports and find it difficult to implement
and/or maintain economic and social programs fundamental to
development objectives as funds are diverted from these pur-
poses to cover additional fuel costs.
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However, Mexico with its vast petroleum reserves
for export and domestic use, has moved into a privileged
group of developing nations. Its tasks have been the con-
tinued development of existing reserves and converting oil
revenues into viable development goals. Developing oil re-
serves, is technically within Mexico's capabilities and has
been financially feasible through easily obtainable loans
from private and public international lending sources like
the IMF. The second task is cause for great complexities.
Mexico's development problems are numerous and severe and
choosing appropriate development solutions is a character-
istically uncertain process. The propensity for those with
decision-making authority in Mexico to respond in a decisive
fashion to the needs of the poor, is very must questionable
and indecisive.
Mexico's problem of population growth, unemployment,
rural and urban poverty, urban and U.S. migration, unequal
income distribution, poor rural productivity and a weak
industrial infrastructure must all be addressed comprehen-
sively by the government and acted upon if trends are to be
improved.
In March 1979, the Mexican government announced its
27
Industrial Development Plan, establishing a fairly coher-
ent set of economic plans and policies to achieve goals upon
which nearly all political elites agree. In order to meet
these goals, former President Lopez Portillo developed a
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series of plans for development laying out in detail targets
and strategies to guide government and private sectors
activity through a period covering his administration and
28beyond to the year 19 90. Many of these are derived from
Mexico's desire to reduce its dependence vis-a-vis the United
States and from the view that as a newly industrializing
country Mexico suffers severe trade and other economic dis-
advantages when competing in world markets. High unemployment
and high inflation in addition make Mexico dependent on other
factors discussed earlier, such as labor migration to the
U.S. Nearly all Mexican policy-makers agree upon or give
lip service to at least the general goals of the Mexican
29development model which include:
a. to place priority upon decreasing an unemploy-
ment and underemployment rate which may well be above
40%, with the need to create 525,000 new jobs every
year simply to stay even with the almost 3 percent
population growth rate; and a related effort to ease
what is one of the most inequitable income distribution
patterns in Latin America. 30
b. to lay a sophisticated manufacturing export base
which will provide jobs and take on the burden of main-
taining economic growth as petroleum reserves decline
over a twenty year period.
c. to lay a much more solid base for agriculture,
both for food self-sufficiency and for export.
These planning documents identifying the required
actions to reach specified goals, include some eight sectoral
plans (i.e., employment, education, industry, urban and
rural development) , state plans and the Mexican Food System
(SAM) , all of which are not of equal importance. Of the
sectoral plans, the 1979-1990 National Industrial Development
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Plan (NIDP) and the 1979-1982 Global Development Plan (GDP)
are the two key documents. Both plans emphasize employment
as a key goal, and target very rapid economic growth through
the 80* s in order to achieve this.
I . Agricultural Developments
Mexican industrialization policies have worsened
problems already present in the economy such as a skewed
income distribution and an increasing dualism. As the pro-
ductivity increases of agriculture began to level off in the
32late 19 60's, forces in the market began to reshape production.
The growing urban middle and working classes sought meat,
poultry and processed foods; domestic industry needed such
items as cotton, sugar and soybeans; and the international
market, largely the U.S., sought feeder cattle, vegetables,
citrus and coffee. In the absence of government policies to
offset market forces subsistence crops like corn, beans and
rice gave way to livestock production, forage crops and
export crops.
33
During the past 15 or more years Mexico has
had to import large quartities of grain and other basic
foods while exporting Winter crops as previously mentioned.
In recent years the presumed "comparative advantage" of this
strategy has turned against Mexico, and some observers be-
lieve that by 1990 food imports will eat up over half of
the petroleum revenues. Agriculture is likely to be the
single most important social, political and policy problem
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area for Mexico in the 1980' s and 1990' s. 34 Mexico's rural
areas are its political Achilles Heel.
More specifically Mexican agriculture engages
about 28 percent of the labor force and in 1980 accounted
for less than 9 percent of Mexico's production. The increase
in annual output in this sector has declined from a 5% aver-
age for 1940-1965 to only 2.5% between 1965-1976. This decline
in production represents a severe problem due to the nation's
continued national population growth.
The legacies of previous development policies
shape the current reality, as governments must "undo" or
somehow remedy the situations they inherit, particularly
since policies of industrialization have led to a neglect in
agriculture. From 19 20 to the present a dual agricultural
strategy has been employed by the government. First, in
order to improve living conditions of the poor, land reallo-
cation policies have been followed, by expropriating large
estates from private owners and turning over these and some
government-owned land to peasants for their use. Much of the
land has been divided into ejidos and mostly farmed collec-
tively. All of it is owned by the state and can be passed
down to their heirs. Second, to increase in productivity
a number of large-scale irrigation projects involving new
. , 35land have been formed in vast commercial units.
Recently two problems led Mexican development
officials to modify somewhat this strategy. A dramatic slowing
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of output that was witnessed from the mid 1960's to the mid
1970' s indicated that the large scale irrigation projects
would no longer increase output as they had done initially.
An important factor contributing to low agricultural output
has been poor rainfall, combined with a limited extent of
irrigation. All throughout the 1970' s, rainfall was signifi-
cantly below its historical average. In the 19 78 and 19 79
agricultural years, the situation was particularly bad with
rainfall 15 to 18 percent below normal. The high cost of
additional water for irrigation and saturation of the market
for high-cost crops contributed to this problem.
Additionally demographic pressures complicated
the problem. Mexico's high growth rate combined with a large
population of almost 70 million yields troublesome results:
(1) Its population will almost double by the year 2000;
(2) about half of the population is under 16 years of age,
with obvious implications for nutrition, education and employ-
ment; (3) pressures on land are mounting leading to a
"pulverization" of holdings. These alarming facts led the
secretary of agrarian reform to declare that "old style"
agrarian reform, expropriating land for redistribution to the
37
poor, was infeasible; "there is no more free land."
The second problem was more fundamental to the
overall development scheme. Although the old plan increased
output temporarily, it did little to increase the incomes
of the poor in the rural sector. When the peasants were given
land through redistribution the land was often of poor quality
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and of limited use because it was not accompanied by the re-
quired inputs to make it productive. Thus the average
peasants income remains at the subsistence level.
These and other considerations led the Lopez
Portillo administration to re-emphasize the production of
basic foodstuffs through the Mexican Food System (SAM)
,
established in 1980, and which calls for self-sufficiency in
basic food grains as corn, beans, rice and wheats by the end
of this past year and in other basic staples by the end of
19 85. This would thereby allow the utilization of oil
revenues for the establishment of jobs and increasing the
38living standards of the poor. SAM proposes to revitalize
the rainfed areas and to make changes in credit availability,
agricultural pricing and other key policies which will in-
crease the productivity of those who grow basic foods,
i.e., ejido and other small farmers.
SAM came about as a result of comments and trade
actions from the United States which throughout history has
led to basic Mexican mistrust. This was especially evident
in a Lopez Portillo speech where he very effectively played
on Mexican concerns of fear for "the food weapon" to rally
support for his policy:
We are going to organize the country to produce food
in a dramatic circumstance, one in which it is
becoming clear that the definitive strategic instru-
ment of the superpowers is precisely the food that
they have known how to produce ... it would be tragic
if having resolve the energy problem, we had to





Mexican industry is largely capital-intensive,
a characteristic adding to its development problems rather
than helping resolve them. Capital intensive industrial
projects create few direct jobs and take years to spawn more
40labor intensive industries. The Mexican manufacturing
industry thus faces the challenge of rapidly accelerating
its productivity growth, its labor force and expanding its
output to facilitate greater import substitution and exports.
Even with a capital-intensive industry, Mexico
must decentralize the economy by developing major growth
centers in regions of the country outside its congested
urban centers. This can only be achieved if the Mexican
government invests itself and encourages a more decentralized
form of private domestic and foreign investment through
incentives such as tax credits. Such industrial expansion
41has commenced, and admittedly could be slow initially,
but would relieve the burdensome and massive labor surplus
in and around the cities, which in Mexico City alone con-
42
tinues rising at an average of 1400 persons a day, worsening
the cities severe unemployment, crowding and crime.
Given the 198 2 economic crisis, the regaining
of the private sectors confidence and a continuing effort
to attract investment should remain a key concern of the de
la Madrid period. Diversifying the economy is important not
only in terms of import substitution and employment, but
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also in terms of sustaining the Mexican economy in the long
run when petroleum reserves are eventually exhausted.
3. Energy Developments
Nine years ago, Mexico's status changed from
that of a net oil importer to that of a net oil exporter.
New oil discoveries promised to reinstate Mexico to the status
it had enjoyed in the 1920 's, as a major oil producer, if not
a major exporter. Prior to the more recent petroleum
developments in the Chiapas region, Mexico was producing oil
43from approximately 4,000 wells, mostly in the northeast
coast of the Gulf of Mexico, and most of which were classi-
fied as low yield. By the end of 19 76, the number of new
wells in the south had increased to about 200.
In November 19 8 Mexico announced a National
44Energy Plan with goals through the year 2000. The goals
of the plan are:
1. to export petroleum only insofar as the country
can productively absorb resources from abroad.
2. to attempt to increase the value-added content
of petroleum exports.
3. to use the export of petroleum to diversify
Mexico's foreign trading partners.
4. to take advantage of petroleum sales to absorb
modern technology, develop more rapidly the pro-
duction of capital goods, obtain access to new
markets abroad for manufactured goods, and
obtain better terms for financing.
5. to cooperate with other countries in the develop-
ment and supply of petroleum and in the exploi-
tation of local sources of energy.
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The plan proposed that throughout the 1980 's,
a fixed average export ceiling of 1 . 5 million barrels per
46day (bpd) of petroleum and 300 million cubic feet of gas,
would be adhered to. As of 1981, Mexico had proven reserves
of 70 billion barrels, probable reserves of 30 billion
barrels and potential reserves of 300 billion barrels of
47
oil. Approximately three-quarters of the Mexican reserves
consist of crude oil and the rest takes the form of natural
gas. These wells have a 1000 to one gas to oil ratio (GOR)
,
making Mexico the owner of approximately 5 percent of world
proven reserves of crude oil and 3 percent of world proven
, , 48
reserves of natural gas.
The natural gas produced in parallel from the
oil wells is expected to increase significantly, as will
total gas production. Whereas in 1976 this production was
equivalent to 18 million metric tons annually, by 1980 the
production of natural gas reached an approximate level of
30 million tons. Mexico's production of liquidifed petroleum
gas (LPG) totalled 20.5 million barrels per year in 1976
and reached a level of 28 million barrels in 1980. These
developments reverse the trend whereby internal demand for
LPG had necessitated increasing imports in recent years,
especially to serve Monterrey and several other major cities
49
in the northeast part of the country.
Although Mexico is a non-member of the Oil Pro-
ducing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) , its policies on price
44

increases are comparable or slightly above OPEC levels. 50
These escalating prices combined with expanded production
raised Mexico's hydrocarbon export earnings from $311 million
in 1976 to $10.4 billion in 1980, with 1981 revenues estimated
slightly higher. Oil wealth not only generated foreign
exchange, but also enhanced the country's attractiveness to
foreign capital markets, especially those of industrialized
nations. The blessing and availability of these enormous
resources made the Mexican government optimistic about the
future. Mr. Diaz Serrano, former director general of
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) , noted, "For the first time in
history Mexico enjoys sufficient wealth to make possible not
only the resolution of economic problems facing the country,
but also the creation of a new permanently prosperous coun-
52try, a rich country where the right to work will be a reality."
Although the continued exploitation and explora-
tion of oil resources continues as fast as it can, the Lopez
Portillo administration was also hoping to derive 25 percent
of energy requirements from non-oil sources by the year 2000,
including nuclear sources. However, with the current economic
crisis, the previous governments ambitious nuclear energy
program which called for an installed nuclear generating
capacity of 20,000 megawatts by the turn of the century, may
be discarded. The nuclear option is likely to be substi-




Petroleum production and export policy thus became
important in terms of domestic consumption and growth
issues, and also as a factor in determining what kind of
a deal Mexico is able to negotiate for itself in inter-
national trade.
B. REGULATIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The most severe problem facing foreign investors in
Mexico is one of "nationalism." Nationalism itself has
been of great benefit in Mexico and without it there would
54probably be no United Mexican States. To understand
this attitude towards investment from abroad, its roots
embedded in early history, must be realized.
After its independence from Spain, and more specif-
ically during the Porfiriato Era, special protective measures
and incentives offered were instrumental in drawing foreign
capital to Mexico. European and United States capital were
invested chiefly in communications, oil, mining and other
55basic industries. The Porfiriato Era culminated in the
Mexican Revolution, which among other causes, resulted from
the extreme poverty of the rural population in contrast to
the great wealth and extensive landownings of a few local
families and a handful of foreigners.
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 established the social
function of private property, laying the basis for extensive
regulation of private economic activity, with the revolu-
tion. Article 27 of the constitution states, "The Nation
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will always have the right to impose on private property
the modalities which the public interest dictates, as well
as the right to regulate for social benefit." 56
Since that date Mexico has enjoyed relative politi-
cal stability, although foreign investment decreased con-
siderably until about 1940, as a result of the nationali-
zation of railroads, oil industry and the expropriation of
land for distribution to agricultural workers.
The government's current attitude towards foreign
investment started in 1960 with the program referred to as
the "Mexicanization Program." This program does not exclude
foreign investment, and was designed to ensure that Mexicans
would participate in their country's industrial development
and that foreign investment would benefit Mexico as well as
the foreign investor.
Foreign investment can take many forms, such as in-
direct investments, international organization aid, and direct
investment. The latter is the interest of this section, as
it is subject to Mexican regulations designed to ensure that
such investment contributes to the economic development of
Mexico without affecting its political or socioeconomic goals
57
or displacing available Mexican capital
.
Mexico has long been regarded as a strongly inter-
ventionist state. The state has been active as financier,
producer, regulator and developmental planner of the
Mexican economy, extending the scope of these activities
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throughout the past decade. During the 19 70's, Mexico in-
creased the regulatory policies covering foreign direct and
technology transfer. These new regulations had several
goals: first to strengthen the national private sector by
reversing the trend towards the so-often referred to "de-
nationalization," and second, to decrease the outflow of
payments associated with foreign investment by controlling
the payments for technology transfer, by eliminating or
reducing those practices of foreign firms that tended to re-
duce exports, by encouraging local sourcing and by stimulating
58
exports. There were other goals of these policies such
as regional decentralization and the creation of job oppor-
tunities, but these were secondary to strengthening national
business and improving the balance of payments.
The administration of President Luis Echeverria (1970-
1976) had a special interest in transnational corporations,
as well as the relations between international and national
policies. Building on the interventionist model of the
post-revolutionary state in Mexico and on the regulatory
tradition of post-World War II governments, Echeverria adopted
a series of policies to regulate the structures and activi-
ties of transnational enterprises . Among these was the
Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign
Investment," which became effective May 9, 1973.
The foreign investment law was in many ways a com-
pilation of existing policies towards investment, but also
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included new provisions as depicted in Appendix A . The most
novel aspect of the law, when compared to past Mexican
practice, is the requirement for prior permission for most
activities involving foreign investors. This includes new
investments, acquisitions of more than 25 percent of capital,
expansions which would increase the percentage of foreign
ownership, opening of new plants and the expansion into new
59produce lines. The "Mexicanization" provisions of the law,
provides that at least 51 percent of the equity capital in new
investments, must be held by Mexicans. However, the law is
not retroactive and possibly due to oversight or to the temp-
tations involved in making decisions of this magnitude, the
possibility for deviation from the strict 51 percent require-
6
ment exists. On top of this, the law specified a total
of seventeen conditions under which the National Commissio-
on Foreign Investment, which was created by the law, could
authorize foreign ownership in excess of any specified
limits
.
These regulations on foreign direct investment, have
only had a modest impact. Two of its principal goals were
preventing the increasing domination of Mexican industry by
transnational firms and improving the balance of payments.
More change has probably been achieved in the first area.
Table I shows that new enterprises established after the
19 7 3 law was passed were more likely to be Japanese, German
or British than was the case in the past. However, it is




ENTERPRISES ESTABLISHED AFTER THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW OF










United States 264 64.0% 79.4% 72.2%
Japan 21 5.3% 0.8% 2.0%
Germany 18 4.3% 3.4% 6.5%
United Kingdom 18 4.3% •3 . J T9 3.9%
Switzerland 15 3.5% 2.7% 4.2%
Canada 12 2 . o% 1.6% 2.0%
France 11 2.6% 1.5% 1.4%
Panama 10 2.3% * *
Italy 8 1.9% 2.0% 1.5%
Spain 7 1.6% * *
Belgium 5 1.1% 1.7% 2.0%
Lichtenstein 5 1.1% * *
Others (14 coun tries, 24 5.6% 3.6% 4.3%
less than 1% each;
TOTAL 418 100.0 100. ; 100.0%
,t
Included in "other."
fDue to rounding, figures may not total exactly 100%
Source: National Registry of Foreign Investment.
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in the bargaining power of the state vis-a-vis firms from
the U.S., or simply due to the increased availability of
foreign investors from those countries due to their own
industrial expansion.
Additionally, these new regulations did not seem to
have a negative impact on U.S. firms investments or profits.
Table II shows that, and except for the year 1976, when the
Peso was devalued by the Echeverria administration for the
first time in 22 years, the value of foreign investment and
profits by U.S. firms in Mexico continued to rise. Per-
haps near the end of the 1970' s and the beginning of the
1980' s, the marked increase in investment can be credited
to the interest in oil. In 1980, U.S. investment in Mexico
had increased to $1.6 billion, with an expected $4 billion
in 1982, compared to $322 million in 1977.
As can be noted, the continued growth of foreign
involvement in Mexico throughout the last decade was not
demonstrably hurt by the increase in state regulation.
This points out that even in a country with a central govern-
ment so solidly interventionist as Mexico, the ability of
the state to control foreign investment is rather limited.
C. U.S. -MEXICAN VIEWS OF TRADE POLICIES VIS-A-VIS EACH OTHER
1 . The Issue
As of 1980, Mexico became the third largest
trading partner of the United States after Canada and Japan.




(A) VALUE AND (B) EARNINGS OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
MEXICO, LATIN AMERICA, AND WORLD, 19 71-19 78
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Total Total L .A. as % Mexico as Mexico as
Year World L.A. o.f World [ Mexico % of L.A. % of World
(A) VALUE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
1971 86,198 12,982 15.1 1,838 14.2 2.1
1972 94,337 13,667 14.5 2,025 14.8 2.1
1973 103,675 13,527 13.0 2,379 17.6 2.3
1974 118,819 14,597 12.2 2,854 19.5 2.4
1975 124,212 16,394 13.2 3,200 19.5 2.6
1976 136,396 17,125 12.5 2,976 17.4 2.2
1977 149,848 18,882 12.6 3,230 17.1 2.2
1978 168,081 21,336 12.7 3,712 17.4 2.2
(P)
(B) EARNINGS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
1971 10,299 1,239 12.0 123 9.9 1.2
1972 11,485 1,372 11.9 197 14.3 1.7
1973 16,940 1,992 11.7 268 13.4 1.6
1974 25,612 2,248 8.8 387 17.2 1.5
1975 16,434 2,123 12.9 448 21.1 2.7
1976 18,999 1,906 10.0 70 3.7 0.4
1977 20,081 2,290 11.4 322 14.1 1.6
1978 25,656 2,694 10.5 597 22.2 2.3
<P> MnTVQ. • TTpirn i nn<; = Varnina of incorpc•rated and iinincorporat
affiliates
(p) = Preliminary data
L.A. = Latin America excluding Caribbean
Source: Survey of Current Business, various numbers
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interdependence involving trade, migration, finance and
technology exchange. The sensitivity of the U.S. and
Mexican economies to their interconnection is quite lop-
sided since in 19 79 almost 70 percent of Mexico's trade
was with the U.S., (Table III), whereas Mexico represented
only 5.4 percent of U.S. total international trade in 1979
(Table IV) . This assymetry is a result of an 8 to 1
differential in productivity between both nations, plus
the much larger U.S. population which gives the United
States a greater base from which to operate. For Mexico,
the overriding importance attached to national development
leads the government to insist on autonomy of the govern-
ment's trade and investment decisions. In contrast the
United States has based its own trade policies on a series
of international commitments, particularly those embodied
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
.
Disagreements are bound to arise when two nations
have such divergent approaches to trade. In light of the
crucial politico-economic relationship between both coun-
tries, trade policy change by one country or the other can
be of great significance, sometimes creating political
stances which must be ameliorated by heads of state or
cabinet officials.
2 . Mexican Export Policy
The key to Mexican export policy is a vast




MEXICO'S MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, BY COUNTRY AND AREA,
1975-1979
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
(In Millions of Dollars)
United States 1,614 1,854 2,399 4,411 6,147
Canada 43 48 44 61 74
Europe 333 367 397 572 1,098
South America 268 315 371 381 419
Caribbean and Central America 214 191 215 240 271
Other including: 233 214 224 552 905
Israel 44 65 70 106 299
Japan 109 100 82 171 248
People's Republic of China 25 9 17 123 129
TOTAL 2,705 2,989 3,650 6,217 8,914
(In Percentages)
United States 59.7 62.0 65.7 70.9 68.9
Canada 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.8
Europe 12.3 12.3 10.9 9.2 12.3
South America 9.9 10.5 10.2 6.1 4.7
Caribbean and Central America 7.9 6.4 5.9 3.9 3.0
Other including: 8.6 7.2 6.1 8.9 10.2
Israel 1.6 2.2 1.9 1.7 3.3
Japan 4.0 3.3 2.2 2.8 2.8
People's Republic of : China 0.9 0.3 0.4 2.0 1.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
NOTE: Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
preliminary Data.
Source: Banco de Mexico, Indicadores economicos, December 1977 and




U.S. EXPORTS TO MEXICO, BY MAJOR COMMODITY CATEGORIES,
1975-1979
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979







509 285 580 786 760
1,497 1,436 1,878 2,369
1,913 2,007 1,679 2,452 5,431
893 927 868 1,174 666
270 274 259 391 436
5,160 4,990 4,822 6,681 9,667
As percentage of
total U.S. exports 4.8 4.3 4.0 4.6 5.4
NOTE: Because this table is based on data from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census, the figures differ from Mexican trade data. Detail
may not add to totals because of rounding.
Schedule E codes and 1.
Schedule E codes 2-5 and 671-677 and 681-691.
C
Schedule E codes 6 and 7 less 671-677, 681-691, 781, 785, 793, and 799
Schedule E code 8 and 781, 785, 793, and 799.
Schedule E code 9.
Source: Overseas Business REports, "United States Trade with Major
Trading Partners, 1972-1978," Department of Commerce,
International Trade Administration, May 1980, pp. 33-35
for 1976-1978; and Department of Commerce, "U.S. Exports




exports. Priority industries, economic expansion of de-
pressed regions, and small business strength are encouraged
by the widely applied system of tax promotion certificates
called CEPROFIS, which are also granted on the bases of
export performance. There are other varied incentives such
as reduced rates for electricity and gas, preferential loan
rates and rebates from 4 percent to 100 percent of ad
valorem duties paid on machinery and equipment not produced
in Mexico but utilized in the manufacture of products for
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export. According to a recent study, exporters can expect
credit on more agreeable terms and more administrative
cooperation when applying for investment and import licenses.
Various incentives are also available to the in-bond affili-
ates or maquiladoras of U.S. corporations established on the
Mexican side near the border, which assemble imported
components into finished products. The number of maquiladoras
had grown to 600, accounting for $1 billion in earnings and
64
several billion dollars in trade at the end of 1979.
In total the array of subsidies and incentives
provided to Mexican exporters can entail a formidable com-
petitive advantage over the U.S. competition. In theory,
the United States could take a fairly rigorous position
against Mexican subsidies, by defining export subsidies
somewhat more with respect to non-GATT members, or insist
on a complete stop in trade with a country in which no trade
agreement exists. These, however, are rigorous options
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which due to other inherent problems and interests mentioned
later, are not chosen.
3. Mexican Import Policy and Protectionism
Imports play a dominant role in the Mexican
economy. They provide a multitude of goods without which
growth and expansion would be impossible. Such items as
equipment, heavy machinery, technology, a wide range of
consumer goods and basic staples are a necessity.
In the past six years Mexico has attempted to
move from a policy of import substituion of consumer goods
to a policy of selective import substitution of capital goods
and a concentration on export promotion of most manufactured
fi 5
goods. This policy was aimed at producing internally what
could be produced, basically consumer goods, with the end
result that consumer goods imports have been kept to a
minimum.
Until 1976 Mexico had a high tariff structure,
but more importantly had strict quotas on most of the 7000
items on tariff schedule. In addition, import permits were
granted not by a centralized executive agency, but by sec-
tor specific import committees formed by domestic manufac-
turers, who would approve import licenses on a case-by-case
basis. This non- structured modus operendi not only resulted
in ample protectionism but also led to virtual extortion
among domestic manufacturers who would turn down import
requests, claiming that the product was manufactured locally.
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As of December 19 79, only 1,729 items on the tariff schedule
were subject to prior permit, though these still represent
55% of imports by volume and 60% by value. In areas such
as durable consumer goods, quantitative import restrictions
have been replaced by technical/bureaucratic judgements
within the Ministry of Commerce, making decisions signifi-
6 6
cantly more centralized.
A possible entry into GATT and its implications,
would eventually produce an even more significant reduction
of both tariffs and non-tariff restrictions. However, as
mentioned in the next section, at present Mexico is unwilling
to take the step towards implementing a free trade philosophy
The next step towards a more liberal policy would be the
introduction of a two-year procedure which commenced in 19 81
to remove import restrictions on all but 700 items on the
tariff schedule. This latest move is not without opponents
in Mexico, but it does create a coincidence of interests
between nationalist and statist officials, and intellectuals
and elements of the private sector harmed by imports of
consumer goods.
Mexico's insistence on trade policy autonomy
has as its corollary the importance its officials attach to
the ability to raise trade disagreements directly with the
President of the United States or his senior staff and
cabinet officers. The result is a highly personal, case-
by-case approach to trade disputes in which arguments may
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be supported by reference to other dimensions of the bi-
lateral relationship, for example, energy, migration, water
sharing, or the close and mutually beneficial economic ties
that currently exist between both nations. There is no
doubt that this policy is a response to the disparities in
size and economic strength that exist between both countries,
and to the fact that the United States is aware that the
bilateral trade is far more important to Mexico and its
economy, but no less important to U.S. interests.
4
.
Mexico at the Tokyo-Round
With the possible exception of hige oil dis-
coveries, Mexico's announcement, that it would defer entry
into GATT, has caused more concern in the United States,
than any other trade-related issue.
Mexico actively participated in the Tokyo Round,
but ultimately opted for its continued policy of non-adherence
to The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and also de-
clined to sign the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, which covers the main issue between the two coun-
tries regarding imports of Mexican products into the U.S.
The GATT issue points up most clearly the two levels of
trade conflict between Mexico and the United States: sub-
6 7
stance and strategy. The U.S. has continuously emphasized
the immediate substantive advantages for Mexico's inclusion,
while Mexican opponents of GATT have predicated strategic
disadvantages. While there were many Mexican business
interests and some top government officials who favored
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GATT membership, the blatant opposition of Mexican news-
papers, small businessmen dependent on a protected domestic
market, and some government officials, were able to deflect
Mexico ' s movement towards GATT membership
.
The United States perspective and its desire for
Mexico to join GATT, reveals that the U.S. would like to
see Mexico move toward a free trade orientation with emphasis
on a Mexican decentralized trade policy-making process.
Puzzlement over the decision left many in the U.S. bewildered,
however, some noted that Mexico negotiated the best GATT
entry protocol ever negotiated. Mexico is the largest U.S.
trading partner not in GATT, and U.S. officials emphasize
the importance of developing a framework to negotiate trade
issues quietly, to avoid having each conflictual issue become
too politicized and damage the overall relationship. Addi-
tionally, Mexico probably views the GATT much as it views
the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel;
it can take advantage of the benefits without becoming a
member of the fraternity.
The basis for Mexico's opposition to join GATT
may be divided into those arguments which refer to Mexico's
strategic negotiating position vis-a-vis the industrialized
world, primarily the U.S. The following points underlie
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the strategic argument:
(1) Entry into GATT, regardless of specific
exceptions negotiated for Mexico, implies accepting
the rules of the international trade game laid down
by the U.S. and Europe. Mexican entry into GATT
means at least tacit acceptance of a free trade
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ideology and the gradual elimination of protection,
regardless of how much domestic policy-makers feel
it is inappropriate in specific cases.
(2) The multilateral context for negotiating
trade issues puts Mexico at a disadvantage vis-a-
vis the U.S., its major and overwhelming trading
partner. For the first time in history the U.S.
needs trade with Mexico as much as or more than
Mexico needs trade with the U.S. This is true not
only because of U.S. petroleum needs, but also be-
cause, with the oil boom the internal Mexican market,
once out of this crisis, may continue expanding rapidly
and provide for the U.S. the opportunity to expand
exports which are increasingly crucial to maintaining
the value of the dollar, financing other trade defi-
cits, and of major importance in world competition.
As mentioned previously, the decision by Mexico
to defer entry into GATT, resulted in a difference of
opinion with the U.S. and a major debate within Mexico.
While former President Lopez Portillo is believed to have
favored entry into GATT, he took no active public role
in the debate, but opted for a protracted public debate on
the issue and abided by the result. This may have been as
a result of the fact that leftist opposition, which support
a nationalist development model, lined up against GATT and
because of other decisions such as an increase in oil pro-
duction, for which the government was being criticized for
leaning too far towards capitalist internationalism. In
this sense, the decision not to enter GATT was the center
of the most important policy issues since the nationalization
of foreign oil companies in 19 38; the embedded nationalist




At first glance, it would seem that Mexican
resistance to participating in GATT and in the rules of
protocol from the Tokyo Round will lead to a climate of
continuous tension originating in threats or effective
application of taxes, duties and "anti-dumping" measures.
Even if Mexico was officially considered just another
country without the special treatments of GATT, the reality
is that the U.S. is obligated to take into consideration
other elements of its bilateral relationship, such as
issues of migration and energy sources on top of a favor-





V. UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN MEXICO
The bilateral component of the relationship between the
United States and Mexico overshadows any other differences
which both nations may have. Nowhere in the hemisphere is
the need for greater attention clearer than in relations
with the United States' next door neighbor, Mexico. Whether
the issue is trade, energy, the northward wave of Mexican
emigrants, or a combination of all these, the sovereign
nation south of the U.S. border speaks with a stronger
voice nowadays, and its problems and policies increasingly
affect the United States.
For both security and economic reasons, the stakes of
the U.S. in the stability and continued growth of Mexico
are immense. We are traveling through a delicate period
in Mexico's history which is of utmost interest to the
United States, for the future of bilateral relations be-
tween both nations will depend largely on what actions the
U.S. pursues now in its foreign policy.
The end of the Lopez Portillo Presidency left Mexico
and its economy in a state of ruins. High inflation, an
almost worthless peso, unemployment, underemployment, and
the world's largest foreign debt have caused concern among
politicians in Washington.
There are those who advocate: "that the current economic
crisis, while serious, can be viewed as a temporary financial
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'imbalance'." The solutions are short-term in nature, and
are viable options for the government. Prospects for future
economic stability in Mexico depend on the willingness and
ability of the government to enact necessary monetary and
fiscal reforms.
Regardless of how temporary, Mexico is undergoing some
very hard economic realities and social concerns. The
revolution in El Salvador has generated thousands of refu-
gees, many of whom have crossed into Mexico. In addition
Guatemalan refugees are streaming into Mexico causing severe
problems along its southern border. As long as violence
continues in Central America, Mexico will continue to be
flooded with refugees it cannot afford to receive.
Mexico's domestic problems coupled with turmoil in
Central America could spark destabilization in Mexico making
it an unmanageable situation along our southern border. The
Mexican government is concerned about the possibility of
Guatemalan refugees forming guerrila groups and commencing
raids back into Guatemala, using Mexico as a staging area.
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This would create immense tension between both states,
placing in jeopardy oil fields near the Guatemalan border.
Recently, 4,000 Mexican soldiers were organized and sent
to Mexico's southern region of Chiapas, with the purpose of
73
the protection of oil fields if the situation arises.
The consequences of major revolutionary violence and
counter-violence from a threatened Mexican government would
include immense human suffering and economic dislocations,
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tremendously increasing the tide of illegal immigrants from
Central America and especially Mexico seeking safety within
the United States. Political and economic costs for the
United States would be immeasureable.
Over the past 150 years, there has been friction between
both nations, because what has been perceived as good for
one has not been perceived as good for the other (and vice
versa)
.
But there has also been a will to compromise evi-
denced by the numerous pacts, some implicit and others
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explicit, uniting both nations. However, when this will
to compromise does not exist, the demands for extreme solu-
tions range from guns, electric fences, sensors, and dogs
to a wall extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific
Ocean similar to that wall in Berlin.
A. IMMIGRATION
The history of the United States is largely the story
of immigration. As a refuge and the land of the free and
opportunity, the United States today remains the solution
to oppressive governments, unemployment, and poor to very
poor living standards. This fact reaffirms the faith and
central values which the founding fathers of this nation
had and which we have adopted. President Ronald W. Reagan,
in his speech accepting the Republican nomination for the
presidency, reminded us of that fact when he said:
I ask you to trust that American spirit which knows
no ethnic, religious, social, political, regional or
economic boundaries: the spirit that burned with
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zeal in the hearts of millions of immigrants from





Then, examining the events of the recent past the President
asked:
Can we doubt that only a divine providence placed
this land—this island of freedom here as a refuge
for all those people in the world who yearn to
breathe free? Jews, and Christians enduring perse-
cution behind the Iron Curtain, the boat people
of Southeast Asia, Cuba and Haiti, the victims of
drought and famine in Africa, the freedom fighters
in Afghanistan and our own countrymen held in savage
captivity. 76
Today, however, the United States is faced with the reality
of limitations on immigration. The United States is accept-
ing the fact that it cannot by itself solve the problems
of world migration and must continue to have some limits
on immigration.
77The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
recommended that the U.S. expand bilateral consultations
with other governments, especially Mexico and other regional
neighbors regarding migration. The commission if of the
opinion that such bilateral consultations are necessary if
countries are to find long-term solutions to migration prob-
lems. The issue of undocumented/illegal migration emerged
as the most pressing of all issues presented to the commission.
Only rarely in U.S. history has immigration evoked the
interest and concern that it now does. The main source of
this concern is illegal immigration. Illegal migrations of
persons in search of work occur extensively throughout Europe,
Latin America, and the United States. Such migration to
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the United States is so extensive that hundreds of thousands
of persons annually enter this country outside of the law.
Mexico, which is the principal source of illegal immi-
gration has an extremely high rate of unemployment-under-
employment and low wage levels. On the other hand, the
U.S. provides extensive employment opportunities at a much
higher income level. Inducement of illegal Mexican immi-
grants by employment opportunities alone undoubtedly has a
lot of merit, however, other factors like a common border
and ease of access across it, the existence of family ties
and a supportive ethnic community, and the absence of effec-
tive enforcement of immigration laws contribute to the problem
and give rise to much debate in the United States.
1. Opposing U.S. Perspectives
The postulations of public officials, interest
groups and analysts about the adverse effects of illegal
immigration range from the increased costs it imposes on
local governments for services consumed by deportable aliens
who pay little or no taxes to the weakening of the United
States balance of payments position caused by the remittances
these aliens send home. The best known causal association
is the link made between immigration and unemployment. This
has been a fear long troubling U.S. citizens. This plausible
fear was not reduced by the absence of much evidence to
support it. There was not enough data on illegal aliens in
jobs or whether they displaced citizens; but there was some
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evidence of Americans refusing the sort of tasks that
7 8illegal aliens did. Responses to jobs ads in New York
City, for example, showed that, and in 1977 a Virginia apple
grower claimed he hired U.S. hands to pick fruit but that
they left during the first day because the work was too hard. 79
Others against immigration have gone so far as to
claim that this influx of Mexican workers represents a social
contaminant, a threat to national ethnic integration. William
Colby, former director of the CIA, has claimed that in the
future, Mexican immigration will represent a greater threat
8than the Soviet Union for the United States. Senator Alan
K. Simpson, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration
and Refugees, has stated that immigration from Mexico is a
factor in the growing separatism within the U.S. which could
manifest itself linguistically to the detriment of the
English language. He has compared this situation with what
has happened in Quebec as a basis to begin calling for
measures which would virtually close the border to immigra-
81tion from Mexico.
A different line of thought expressed by public
officials and domestic interest groups views illegal immi-
gration as generally beneficial to the country in that the
undocumented worker fills important labor market needs at
relatively little cost to society. Advocates of this view
argue that undocumented workers or deportable aliens take
the unattractive, lowest-paying, least skilled, dirtiest
jobs in the fields, packing houses , canneries, restaurants,
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hospitals and garment and construction industries while
Americans without jobs prefer to collect unemployment or
welfare
.
Although those in favor and those against illegal
immigration differ as to how to go about finding a solution,
they do generally agree that the Mexican government should
develop stringent programs to foster economic development,
improve employment opportunities and decrease the population
growth in rural areas. It is commonly accpeted that the
main responsibility for promoting such programs rests with
83Mexico's government. However, this logic of viewing ille-
gal immigration as a problem with an easy solution of which
Mexico is the source of the problem and location of the
solution, leads to paternalistic and interventionist pre-
scriptions which are suspicious in Mexico.
Of all current issues between Mexico and the United
States, the uncontrollable flow of Mexican citizens into the
U.S. may well present the most delicate set of problems.
Aside from its economic dimension, it is a sensitive issue
on both sides of the border.
2 . Mexican Perspectives
The benefits for Mexico from this migratory flow
is easy to assess. Migration to the U.S. provides Mexico
with a means of dissipating social pressure with potential
for strife. Political stability in Mexico is therefore
a major concern for the United States. To understand what
is happening in a country whose population reaches 70 million
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and by the year 2000 is expected to pass the 120 million
mark, we need to acquire some knowledge of Mexican perspec-
tives and attitudes towards the United States.
There is a famous saying in Mexico, credited to
Porfirio Diaz, a former President of Mexico, which says,
"Pobre Mejico, tan lejos de Dios, tan cerca de los Estados
Unidos," which translates in English to "Poor Mexico, so
far from God, and so close to the United States." Mexican
attitudes towards the U.S. are characterized by feelings
of fear, mistrust, resentment and frustration. As noted in
Chapter II, these attitudes stem from early history between
both nations dating as far back as the 1820' s. Past history
is not forgotten and lives vividly in Mexico today influenc-
ing its negotiations with the United States. There is no
element of U.S. relations with Mexico whether it be trade,
migration, the price of natural gas or barrels of oil ex-
ported that is untouched by Mexican concerns of U.S. domina-
tion or intervention in Mexican affairs. Professor Victor
L. Urquidi, a professor in Mexico and a member of the United
Nations Advisory Committee on the Application of Science
and Technology to Development, was quoted as saying,
"Mexicans do not look upon the United States and its preda-
tory, self-centered national interest with anything but
mistrust." "Nor do Mexicans readily assume that the U.S.
foreign policy is in the best interests of Mexico or that
84
everything the U.S. does is in the best interest of Mexico."
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In the Mexican mindset, conflicts that occurred before the
turn of the century, and attitudes of nationalism that were
born as a result of the Mexican revolution, must be under-
stood by United States policymakers before insulting com-
ments about misguided Mexican politics and actions are made
which only result in animosity and friction.
Although in the United States, immigration has been
a public issue which changes cyclically during periods of
unemployment, in Mexico it is almost a non-issue. The view
is widespread that migration flows perform valuable services
for both Mexico and the United States. Thus it serves as a
"safety valve" preserving Mexico's stability, easing the
8 5
effects of rapid population growth, land scarcity, unem-
ployment-underemployment, and rural poverty, and at the
same time provides cheap labor to businesses in the U.S.
Although this view seems beneficial to Mexico, it reflects
a dependency on the U.S. which as mentioned previously,
detracts from U.S. -Mexican relations.
3 . U.S. Policies Towards Immigration
The history of immigration policies directed mainly
at Mexican emmigrants has been plagued with crude actions
on the part of the United States. From massive deportations
in the years of the depression to a creation of new demands
for hired hands at the outbreak of WWII. In 194 2 both govern-
ments established the "Bracero" program under which Mexican
laborers would enter the United States under seasonal con-





The number of workers under contract never rose
above 50,000 during the years of WWII. But the program
stimulated illegal immigration after the war by encouraging
more Mexican applicants for the program than there were
openings.
Most unsuccessful applicants crossed the border
illegally, convinced that jobs would be available. This
increased flow of illegal traffic was further encouraged
when the entrants called "wetbacks," were given legal
status and incorporated into the bracero program once in
the U.S. In 1949 for example, 87,220 wetbacks were legalized,
8 7
while only 19,625 new braceros were admitted to the U.S.
In June 1954 the United States initiated another major
program known as "Operation Wetback," to apprehend and expel
deportable Mexicans. The program lasted only two years and
was credited with approximately 1,000,000 deportations.
After the end of Operation Wetback, labor contracting
diminished immensely. But the end of the bracero program
in 1964 commenced an increase in contracting and the business
of smuggling and procuring false documentation, which again
brought about pressure by the government to curtail illegal
immigration.
Over the past few years, former President Carter and
President Reagan have attempted to find a solution to the
immigration program by adjusting immigration ceilings,
recommending "guest worker programs," and establishing a
legal resident date for those who have been in the U.S. for
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some time. On July 17, 1981, President Reagan approved a
plan to reform U.S. immigration laws. Although Mexico's
position on Central America has superseded all other matters
in the relations between Mexico and the United States from
the Mexican point of view, the question of undocumented
workers continues to be pressing bilateral problems.
A drastic curtailment of undocumented-illegal immi-
gration from Mexico will undoubtedly require rigorous
screening of applicants for nonimmigrant visas, student and
tourism visas, an increase in border surveillance, and con-
tinuous investigation on employers who knowingly hire illegal
immigrants. Illegal immigration deserves attention because
it is a massive violation of law which has the effect of
distorting the objectives of the nation's immigration policy
with respect to the size and composition of the tide of immi-
grants. It also contributes to other illegal acts against
U.S. laws, such as fraudulent documents for use in legitimizing
residency in the United States, and leads to the smuggling of
human cargo. To take no action would only result in a worsen-
ing situation.
However, the impact any of these drastic measures
would have on the nation as a whole would have to be weighed
against a reduction in the number of entries. Reduced
tourism would cause economic losses for the domestic economy
and particularly for cities in the U.S. that rely heavily
on tourism. Admission of fewer foreign students would hurt
the many private U.S. institutions that cater to foreign
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students in general. Heavy fines on large businesses and
farmers which rely on cheap labor to survive would undoubtedly
result in the closure of such businesses and a possible move
by some employers to foreign countries. Finally, an increase
in border surveillance would require an increase in personnel,
both administrative and border patrols, and logistical sup-
port in terms of vehicles, aircraft, sensor devices and the
extension of chain linked fences which only serve to slow
down any crossings. As it stands today, the Border Patrol's
main problem is that it is outmanned. There are approximately
8 82,300 agents on the border, which is just over one agent
per mile if all were on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week. As it is, only 300 are on duty at any one time
because of rotating shifts and vacations.
In the late 19 60's there may have been about 200,000
illegal entries, permanent or temporary, from Mexico per year.
Now the annual number may be as high as 80,000 or even 1
8 9
million, and with the present economic crises, the INS
estimates approximately 2 million Mexicans crossing the
90border illegally in 1983.
B. U.S. ENERGY NEEDS
If illegal immigration represents the "lightning rod"
for U.S. -Mexican relations, then petroleum may provide a
potential "ground wire," assuming that a common framework
, •
91
can be designed to embrace both issue areas.
Since Mexico's discovery of extensive oil deposits in
1976, greater attention has been focused on U.S. -Mexican
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relations. For the first time since President Woodrow
Wilson's expedition led by General John J. Pershing to
catch Pancho Villa, Mexico has something the U.S. badly
wants. This gives Mexican politicians a strong bargaining
tool, but, for reasons mentioned earlier it makes them a
bit nervous also.
The figures on Mexican oil and natural gas mentioned in
Chapter III are impressive, but underestimate Mexico's
importance to the United States as a potential energy
supplier. First, the size of Mexican proven reserves is
likely to continue growing. Second, transportation costs
are lowered substantially due to proximity and third, the
erratic and explosive political situation in the Middle East
have made that region an extremely insecure source of energy.
Mexico offers the only demonstrated potential for large in-
creases in oil exports from a non-OPEC country during the
198 0' s and beyond. 92
United States needs are enormous. In 1978, the U.S.
consumed nearly 19 million barrels of crude oil per day.
Of this amount nearly 8 million, or 4 3 percent, were imported,
mainly from OPEC countries. In 1978 the National Security
Council ordered a review of U.S. -Mexican relations, known in
policy circles as Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 41.
A preliminary draft began with the statement that Mexico is
emerging as "an economic power of strat gic value to the
United States," subsequently quoting CIA sources as sug-
gesting that Mexican petroleum production might reach as
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much as ten MBD by 1990. "For the United States," the
draft continues, "Mexico represents a major new energy
source, presently outside OPEC. Mexico could fill 30 per-
cent of U.S. import needs by the mid-19 8 0' s, thus enhancing
93
security of supply."
In August 1977, a "Memorandum of Intentions" was signed
between Petroleos Mexicanos and six gas transmission firms
in the United States. The deal never materialized because
U.S. negotiators maintained very rigid positions against
Mexican demands regarding the base price per cubic foot asked
by the Mexican government, and so the negotiations were dis-
continued. As a result, it was not until 1979 that the
Mexican and U.S. governments came to agreement on a price
of $3.63 per tcf , for up to 300 million of cubic feet per
day. The price was more than one dollar above the original
1977 proposal, but at last opened a new and secure source
of gas for the U.S.
It is important to note that important sectors of U.S.
public opinion were favorable to Mexico in the gas negotia-
tions. This is deduced from articles and editorials
appearing in such noted periodicals as The Wall Street Journal
and The Washington Post . As an example, with respect to
the gas situation, The Post wrote:
It is understood why the Department of Energy is
fighting to maintain the low priced Mexican fuel.
But the time has come to buy it. The U.S. has a
major interest in stable development of the Mexican
economy and can contribute to it by granting
Mexico access to the North American market for
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its products. A successful transaction of sale of
gas between Mexico and the U.S. promises political
benefits to both countries. 94
Regardless of the difficulties in gas negotiations
during 1977, denunciations by U.S. policymakers on price in-
creases and the fact that Mexico's stated oil production
goals are too slow for the United States, the bottom line
is the U.S. needs a reliable source. Mexico's large petro-
leum reserves are expected by many to make a dramatic dif-
ference for U.S. energy security during the next several
decades. Its exports offer relief from the threat of embargoes
and other forms of political blackmail that rely on the oil
weapon.
1. Oil and Mexican Nationalism
Through Mexican eyes, petroleum and PEMEX represent
realities of extraordinary Mexican nationalism. Since 1938,
petroleum and PEMEX have symbolized the essences of nationalism:
national dignity, economic independence, and state sover-
95
eignty. It is a symbol of dignity and pride because its
achievements prove that Mexico can succeed despite obstacles
and expectations of failure.
Formulation of policy choices are sometimes con-
strained by these powerful symbolic concepts. Throughout
public debates, issues involving the United States are fre-
quently interpreted more in terms of risks for Mexico '
s
sovereignty and freedom of action than in terms of the
possible benefits for Mexico's economic growth, which is
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where the U.S. usually puts its emphasis. In this context,
sovereignty takes priority over development. Economists
within Mexico have conducted extensive detailed analysis
of the effects of Mexico's petroleum development and revenue
earnings on very practical issues such as the inflation
rate, excess liquidity, the balance of payments and the
overall "absorptive capacity" of Mexico's economy. 96 The
stakes are highly political, and for many nationalists these
stakes are just as crucial as inflation rates and unemploy-
ment levels.
According to extreme interpretations of the tradi-
tional principles of Mexican nationalism, zero petroleum
exports would be the best policy. Mexico's oil policies
have remained consistent with nationalist views and call
for domestic consumption first and no more than 4 9 percent
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of total hydrocarbon production to be exported. The de-
bate within Mexico make it clear that the ultimate stakes
include those fundamental principles mentioned earlier. This
is evident not only in petroleum export issues but also in
such concerns as trade relations, border relations and any
other development program in which we suggest any action.
These traditional and nationalistic principles are evident
in Mexico's negotiations and rhetoric, for they discourage
acceptance of ideas of interdependence and partnership, and
develop mistrust and frustrations of its neighbors.
Fortunately, Mexican nationalism is not written into





Central America is presently a deeply troubled area
with the populus furnishing ready recruits for radical or
revolutionary governments. Since the Cuban revolution in
1959, the Soviet Union has continuously been seeking
opportunities directly or indirectly, in the Western Hemis-
phere presenting difficult problems for the United States.
The basic misfortune of the area is that its countries
are small, weak and poor. They are economically dependent
to a high degree with rapidly growing populations and a
sparse industrial development. Unequal distribution,
oppressive governments, misery, unemployment and the control
of power within the elite, has raised the potential of dis-
content over the years to an alarming point. Under these
conditions, extremism flourishes and bullets are seen as the
only solution to changing the status quo. Politics is
strongly ideological and opposing parties do not understand
the virtues of compromise. The parties of discontent are
committed to radical change which makes them inevitably anti-
American because the United States has generally supported
stability and the status quo. Almost continuously since the
19 79 Sandinistas revolution in Nicaragua, a terrorist and
guerrilla threat to Central America seems to occupy most of
the political and diplomatic mid-night oil burning of the
United States.
Regardless of this fact the United States cannot afford
to neglect the area, as it has in the past, or to permit
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anti-American movements to continue advancing. There may
not be strong economic, cultural or historical ties, aside
from the fact that since the Monroe Doctrine Latin America
has been considered to be in the U.S. sphere of influence,
and perhaps there is not much to gain. But, more importantly
what is there to lose? In the epoc of nuclear heyday,
Central America has strategic importance, dominating the
southern approaches to the waterway between the oceans,
a troubled Mexico and leading right into our border with
Mexico. Politically, any setback in the area would have
devastating effects upon United States allies elsewhere.
Few subjects are of more importance for the United States
and Mexico than the future of their bilateral relationship.
Central America has become a key issue in the foreign policy
of the United States and Mexico and has led to a reexamina-
tion of national priorities in both countries and additionally
surfaced the possibility of tension between both neighbors.
United States support for the status quo in Central
America inevitably causes friction with Mexico. This dif-
ference in orientation towards the developments in Central
America stems from Mexico's own history. Having experienced
its revolution in this century (1910-1917) , Mexico tends to
view revolution as a "last resort" in order to b::ing about
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needed social change. From this stems the divergent
perspectives of the U.S. and Mexico towards the continuous
seething in Central America.
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1. United States Perspectives
The Reagan administration's perception of the Central
American crisis has been clearly stated, as the following
examples by the former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig,
Jr., and the much acclaimed State Department "White Paper"
on El Salvador testify:
In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee in March 1981, former Secretary Haig argued
that the insurgency in El Salvador was part of a
"four-phased operation" of which the first phase
was "the seizure of Nicaragua." "Next is El
Salvador," he said, "to be followed by Honduras
and Guatemala." When skeptical Congressmen inquired
as to whether he was implying the domino theory,
he replied: "I wouldn't call it necessarily a
domino theory. I would call it a priority target
list... a hit list if you will... for the ultimate
takeover of Central America. "9 9
The controversial white paper on El Salvador issued
in February 1981 argued that "the situation in El
Salvador presents a striking familiar case of
Soviet, Cuban, and other Communist military involve-
ment in a politically troubled third world country."
According to the State Department, "the insurgency
in El Salvador has been progressively transformed
into a textbook case of indirect armed aggression
by Communist powers" whose objective in El Salvador
as elsewhere "is to bring about the overthrow of the
established government and the imposition of a
communist regime in defiance of the will of the
Salvadoran people. "100
Given the Reagan Administration's focus on East-
West tensions, "regional security" has acquired new signi-
ficance and has necessitated the strengthening of U.S. ties
with friendly governments in the American Hemisphere.
Central America is perceived as important in the global
struggle for power with the Soviet Union, as evidenced by
the administration's continued support for El Salvador.
81

In this view, the renewed U.S. commitment to contain the
expansion of Soviet power would be almost worthless if the
United States could not contain such expansion in its own
backyard.
2. Mexican Perspectives
The Reagan administration has consistently argued
that Mexico is the final domino in the chain of falling
dominoes set off by Cuban-Soviet subversion in Nicaragua.
While the United States focuses on external factors presumed
to dominate developments in Central America, Mexico views
these developments as a response to the endemic problems of
the region and rejects the U.S. cold war definition of the
crisis
.
Instead Mexico emphasizes the economic inequality,
social injustice and political repression which has sparked
broad based opposition movements in countries like Nicaragua,
El Salvador and Guatemala. Mexican government spokesmen
see the political conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua as
residing in the failure of the Somoza regime and the cur-
rent regime in El Salvador from facing the principal develop-
ment problems, primarily those of unequal distribution.
The views from Mexico have not always opposed U.S.
policies towards this area. For a long time, Mexican public
opinion regarded the Salvadoran rebels as extreme left wing
guerrillas. Two developments in 1980 changed this impression
One was the rapid deterioration of the government installed
by the October 19 79 coup in El Salvador, and the other was
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the increasing support to rebel activities from different
102sectors of Salvadoran society. In the Mexican perspec-
tive, the political regimes in the region have been unable
or unwilling to adapt to newly emergent social forces spawned
by economic growth, increased trade, increased commerciali-
zation of agriculture, urbanization and so forth.
Mexican foreign policy has traditionally shown good
will toward movements for social change in Latin America.
Mexico had excellent relations with the reformist government
of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in the early 19 50's;
it was the only country that opposed sanctions on revolu-
tionary Cuba in the early 1960's; and it enthusiastically
backed the government of Salvador Allende in Chile. Two
of the aforementioned cases terminated in United States
intervention and the ousting of the country's leaders. The
third, Cuba, has become a nightmare for the United States,
providing the main focus of East-West tensions in the Western
Hemisphere
.
Former Mexican President Lopez Portillo frequently
voiced his interpretation of the problem during his six
year term (1976-1982) . In April 1981 he drew an analogy
between the U.S. explanation of the upheavals in Central
America and the Soviet explanation of the upheavals in
Poland. Both explanations emphasize "outside agitation."
But such explanation, is in the words of Lopez Portillo,
"an insult to intelligence." According to the former
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president, "in our continent, social injustice is the true
womb of unrest and revolutionary violence. The theory
that foreign subversion is the origin to our ills is
103
unacceptable to the democratic nations of our area."
Mexico has a long-standing non-intervention tradi-
tion, one that regards with considerable apprehension any
action that might lead to intervention. Left leaning diplo-
macy helps to maintain Mexico's political stability and
strengthens the government's power in dealing with the
country's left-wing opposition. More importantly, in dis-
playing independence from the United States, Mexico tends





Trade, petroleum and immigration issues between neigh-
bors create a great web of problems and interests that often
vibrate with tension. Some of these vibrations result from
the history of relations between the two countries, espec-
ially as they recall slights or humiliations. National goals,
molded by history, social structures, institutional aims,
and nationalistic dreams, help determine international
relations. Individual issues such as political orientation,
economic development, petroleum and immigration are part of
a net of calculation, but the accuracy of the calculation is
not known until the future has become the present. Who
could have dreamed in 19 38 the roles that petroleum and
immigation would play 4 5 years later in the relations be-
tween Mexico and the United States? The stakes in U.S.-
Mexican relations are high, not only because of alarming
numbers of illegal immigrants or the fact that Mexico has
an enormous amount of proven hydrocarbon deposits (which
may increase the possibility of U.S. energy security),
but because a stable and prosperous Mexico is essential
to the national security interests of the United States.
The range and diversity of issues in their relations is
probably greater than with any other country in the world.
We are experiencing a delicate moment for Mexico and
the United States, and prospects for the future will depend
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largely on what the U.S. does now. The most important
U.S. -Mexican issues will not be susceptible to any rapid
solutions by negotiation, because what is good for one is
not always good for the other and vice versa. The points
of contention arise from social forces and economic trends
largely outside the customary domain of foreign policy. All
that pertains to Mexican-U.S. relations is bothered by
Mexican nationalistic sensitivities. Mexican revolutionary
ideology carries an omnipresnet strain of anti-Yankeeism that
pervades Mexican responses to the United States. Although
relations between the two nations are basically rather good,
a certain fragility is always present, implying a threat of
serious disagreements and introducing a sense of unpredicta-
bility. Regardless of this very important fact, the inter-
mingling of both societies, the sharing of a 2,000 mile
border, and the pursuing of human needs on both sides of
the border create an enduring relationship that will involve
friction as well as interdependence.
Illegal immigration from Mexico into the U.S. has
definitely become a blessing for the Mexican government
(especially during these days of crisis) , a benefit for
some in the U.S., and an aggravating problem for U.S. Law.
However, the stream of Mexicans crossing the border will
never end as long as there exists such a wide gap in wage
levels between the U.S. and Mexico and a need for unskilled
workers in the U.S. The ideal solution would be for Mexico
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to have the wealth and economy that the United States has.
A stable, healthy economy with plenty of jobs and food is
the only answer but yet seems so hard to achieve. In view
of the long history and the powerful social/economic fac-
tors behind illegal immigration, no single act or set of
actions by the U.S. will eliminate the problem. The problem
is a direct result of the issues which link U.S. -Mexican
relations. Trade issues, energy issues, and the problems
of migration are dealt with as separate blocks, when in
reality they are very much interrelated. They are very much
linked, for the decrease in numbers of illegal immigrants
from Mexico will depend on a healthy Mexican economy with
job opportunities, and a healthy Mexican economy will depend
on the opening of U.S. markets for the labor intensive
Mexican exports.
The U.S. has on occasion emphasized an increase in Mexi-
can oil production. An optimistic scenario for the use of
oil income envisages export revenues and new capital flows
sufficient to enable the massive foreign debt to be repaid,
capital goods for the further development of hydrocarbons
to be manufactured or imported, with enough left over to
make massive investments in developmental projects that with
time will reduce unemployment, arrest the flight from rural
to urban areas and assist in reducing the glaring inequali-
ties between those who live in comfort and those consigned
to poverty. Increased oil production may accelerate forma-
tion of capital for job opportunities, but the export market
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has to be there. If the markets are not available the
temptation will be to continue spending oil revenues on
imports and food staples from abroad, placing a lid on
employment opportunities, frustrating Mexican economic growth,
and pushing up migration. (In January of 19 83 alone, the
INS caught 83,811 aliens along the border-up 46% over the
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same time a year ago. ) It is a vicious circle where as
former Mexican President Lopez Portillo once said, "Every-
thing Is Part of Everything Else." The problem simply
cannot be solved until such time as the Mexican economy is
capable of providing for the country's citizens.
The key question is how long the people will endure the
hardships of austerity programs before there is widespread
public backlash. Prices for food, clothing, gasoline and
other basic goods keep soaring. Wages lag and construction
is slow. In Mexico the government is the force behind
development, and if austerity programs directed by the IMF
agreement mean cuts, then the end result is the slowing of
the economy with high unemployment, poor living conditions
for the majority and malnutrition for the poor.
Several key indicators of a troubled nation that could
eventually light up like a match causing a revolution, are
present: a large population of 73 million of which 40%-
50% are unemployed or underemployed; an inflation rate
funning at about 100%; a high exchange rate; an external
debt of over $80 billion; income inequality and a wide gap
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between the poor and the rich. Although Mexican political
leaders consider the left to be no real threat to the estab-
lished order in Mexico, during times of serious stress this
could change rapidly. The problems of unemployment and
extensive poverty have grown so rapidly, that the continued
neglect by those with decision-making powers becomes an
increasingly dangerous political game. If the government
addresses these problems only as a matter of rhetoric, the
potential for political violence in Mexico may easily build.
The problem of world hunger in relation to national
security may seem a far cry from seeds, soil, and proteins.
By habit we think of national security in terms of military
forces and their capabilities to defend from an aggressor
attack, which may lead to mass destruction of our people,
territory and way of life. But another aspect of national
security entails the ability to live in peace, not only
from military aggression, but also from non-military dangers
which may disintegrate the best of systems and drag a nation
over the fateful threshold between a state of peace and a
state of internal unrest and even war.
Current trends and developments in world affairs have
created a dramatic intensification of threats that can reach
across boundaries threatening our capacity to live in total
security. Threats from over population of the globe, hunger,
to even the air that we breathe. The world food situation
is in decline and will continue to deteriorate throughout
the remainder of the century as population pressures are
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felt and the amount of deforested non-usable arable land
105continues to rise. Mexico is experiencing both of these
evils, and although the technology exists to counter such
threats, many developing nations are unable to implement
productivity increases (partly because of political con-
straints) which therefore result in scarcity of food causing
much higher prices and Mexico's balance of payments to
deteriorate drastically.
Agriculture has become a weak link in Mexico whereby
food imports have been using up a substantial amount of
petroleum revenues to feed the nation. Although Mexico
is reluctant to accept suggestions from the U.S., it is in
U.S. national security interests to turn this trend around
and encourage the continuation of those measures included
in their Mexican Food System and Plan Global de Desarrollo
1980-82.
During the next two decades we must focus more attention
on our own backyard. We must emphasize political alliances,
economic cooperation, expanded military interaction to foster
stability and enhance the economic development of those
countries in need. Mexico should be encouraged to pursue a
much larger leadership role in establishing initiatives
with other Latin American countries to which they can
relate
.
The importance of the bilateral relationship between the
U.S. and Mexico is undeniable. The geographic location,
economic development and political significance of Mexico
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have contributed over the years, to a complex set of inter-
relationships between both societies. However, to this date
the United States and Mexico have basically "agreed to dis-
agree, " on key issues such as liberalization of trade and
solutions to the problems within Central America.
Despite the actual and potential costs to Mexico of
policies that restrict free trade, there is little likelihood
that Mexico would agree to liberalize its trade policies
significantly as part of a special relationship with the U.S.
As the decision to postpone entry into the GATT showed,
Mexico still feels vulnerable to foreign competition and
continues to resist agreements that may remove economic
decisions from government control. In regards to Central
America, to date neither nation has had to face a crisis in
their relationship stemming from their foreign policy dif-
ferences regarding that area. It is apparent that how
each nation chooses to deal with Central America may have
devastating effects on bilateral relationships, and make it
difficult if not impossible for them to be forthcoming and
cooperative with each other.
Mexico's analysis of both the problem and the solution
in Central America is shaped by events in its recent past.
The political elite that governs Mexico today came to power
in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1910 which began as a
rebellion against the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. In
view of this revolutionary heritage, it becomes very difficult
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for Mexico's leaders to align themselves at least publicly,
against revolutionary movements, particularly when these
aim to oust repressive dictatorships. This stand by the
Mexican government has been repeatedly consistent including
opposition to the ousting of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from
Guatemala in 1954; refusal to accept sanctions against Cuba
in 1960; opposition to a peace keeping force in the Dominican
Republic in 1965; and recognition of the Sandinista govern-
ment in 1979. Furthermore Mexico claims as one of the great
achievements of the revolution, the establishment of a
civilian dominated political system in which the professional
military is subservient to the elected officials. Any policy
that would reinforce military rule in other countries runs
the risk of enhancing the legitimacy of military rule in
Mexico.
Revolutions in Central America have resulted for the
same reasons that existed long before the United States or
the Soviet Union came into being. The lands of Central and
South America and Mexico were not only discovered and
colonialized, but they were also conquered, and conquest
plus colonization spells what Max Weber called patrimonial-
ism, a condition brought on by the confusion of all public
and private rights in favor of the chieftain and his clan
10 6
of relatives, sycophants, and hangers on.
Since independence from Spain (received by most Latin
Americans in the early 1800' s), these traditional patrimonial
functions, have been the style of governance in Latin America,
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If there is outside interference in the area, such inter-
ference is not the prime mover in the regions conflicts.
Rather, it exploits a situation whose underlying causes
reside in economic and social inequalities accompanied by
political indifference and ruthless military suppression
of dissidence. The solutions to the problems lie in politi-
cal rather than military measures and must come from within
It is therefore important to note that in terms of U.S.-
Latin American relations, Mexico clearly identifies with
the dependent, vulnerable and long-suffering Latin American
countries against brutal and repressive regimes.
Several countries of Latin America have experienced the
problems of revolution, dictatorships and military regimes
and many have opted for governments amenable to the populus
The United States should seek recommendations from these
nations in hope of finding a negotiable solution to the
misery, inequality, oppression and overall chaos. These
developing nations should not be placed in a position to
choose between the United States and Soviet Union, and that
is exactly where the U.S. is placing its emphasis by con-
tinuing support to governments who have flagrantly violated
every rule on earth. Mexico knows clearly what it does not
want to see in Central America: intervention on the part
of any external power. What is not clear is how Mexico can
incorporate its historic support for non-intervention into
a foreign policy capable of promoting its own national
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interests in light of the ongoing domestic economic crisis
and an increasing refugee problem causing concern along
its southern border.
A solution for Central America must be found now, before
increased suffering and chaos reaches uncontrollable heights.
If the United States wants to continue playing an active
part in the Western Hemisphere, then it should use the neces-
sary leverage to get to the root of the problem, and that
could entail economic sanctions against countries held
responsible for external support to the Salvadoran guerrillas,
or continue undermining governments whose thinking is not
completely democratic, or demanding that each side in the
struggles of El Salvador face each other in negotiations.
These countries contain worthy people, both uniformed and
civilian. They also contain some of the most brutally
repressive military on the face of the earth. Both sides
in El Salvador are guilty of undue violence, and both sides
contain extremist elements which cannot be assimilated.
The problem throughout the region now is just as it has
been since the atrocities committed by Spanish Conquistadores
almost five hundred years ago.
U.S. policy towards Latin America has always been lacking,
and have been considered important only during times of
crisis or U.S. needs. We cannot preach freedom for all, a
commitment to self-determination, stability and democracy,
if we continue avoiding the truth concerning the root of
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the problem. A leader of Mexico's leftist opposition,
Rafael Fernandez, puts the challenge in compelling terms
regarding Mexico, but which translates to the rest of the
region:
For a long time, the United States never thought
about us. Now you're worried about oil. You would
do a little better to worry about the whole country
or one day you could have a surprise. It may not
happen for 10 or 20 years. But the day that Mexico
catches on fire because people do not have enough
food, part of the United States will burn. This
will be your last VIETNAM.
This vision may be a bit far-fetched, but the reality is that
today Mexico is undergoing hard economic times and suffering
social strains, and a continuation of our policies in the
region will only serve to irritate the problem.
These considerations and the underlying realities of
the bilateral relationship lead to the conclusion that if a
political negotiation is to be sought in Central America,
then Mexico should be encouraged to propose alternatives and
take the lead in an area it very well understands. The
United States easily forgets its past and the fact that it
came about from a revolution. A military solution and
the continuation of the status quo is not the answer to
the seething in Central America. If U.S. administrations
expect the Mexican leadership to act differently towards
U.S. policies then they should be willing to make equal
changes in their own behavior towards Mexican policies.
Notwithstanding these obstacles, it seems highly desirable
for the U.S. to recognize and pursue through initiative,
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consultation and perseverance, the linkage of multiple
issues in United States-Mexican relations. Mexico's develop-
ment problems cannot be left unattended, for, as they gain
in intensity, they multiply in number. Urbanization and
unemployment have had a direct effect on crime in some
Mexican cities, added to the concentration of people in
urban areas which leads to increasing levels of awareness
concerning the conditions of Mexican life; poverty, hunger,
marginality and disparity are all accentuated. As time goes
on Mexico's urban centers will become even more crowded with
an estimated population of 31 million for Mexico City by
the year 2,000. If Mexico's capital city gets that large
without tearing itself apart, the problems of food supply,
disposal waste, sanitation, police, water and human relation-
ships would be insoluble.
Upon taking office, President Miguel de la Madrid adopted
a "shock treatment" policy of telling the Mexican populus
the truth about their economic problems as a way of asking
for their assistance. The President ordered anticorruption
measures, and a controller's office was set up to prevent
public officials from enriching themselves while in office.
Police have been reorganized in an attempt to eliminate the
practice of demanding bribes. These changes may only be
significant if the government is serious and willing to de-
fine the problems and formualte and implement policies and
programs that seek to alleviate the present dilemma. If
the government responds as predicted, the next generations of
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Mexicans may fare much better. If not, Mexico's trans-
formation may not follow any official guidelines, but rather
come at the expense of serious upheaval, possibly revolution
The United States needs to face the unpalatable fact
that the immigration problem alone is not solvable without
U.S. investment in the Mexican economy, unless it thinks
it can afford a wall. Instead of dealing with immigration
as part of an overall immigration policy, or dealing with
natural gas pricing as part of its energy plans, the U.S.
should consider them as necessary components of a Mexican
Policy. Mexico is not able to escape from dependence to a
degree, regardless of how much nationalism is embedded in
their political decision-making . But neither can the U.S.
escape from interdependence. The relationship is organic.
The two countries are sufficiently linked economically and
socially that the U.S. government seems reluctant to use
many potential levers against Mexico. In reality many
punitive, unilateral decisions or discriminatory options
can arouse domestic repercussions, as well as run against
U.S. concern to preserve stability in Mexico. The two
cultures along the border have grown so intertwined that
they are often indistinguishable. These constraints indi-
cate that the U.S. actually lacks instruments to hurt Mexico
without also harming its own interests. Any assessment
by U.S. politicians should recognize the interconnections
among issues in the relationship.
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Both nations need each other. The U.S. needs a cheap
labor force, a reliable energy source and a stable neighbor
aside from the fact that Mexico is its third largest trading
partner. And Mexico needs U.S. trade, credit, tourism and
United States security which, although not mentioned at
all, is bascially taken for granted based on a fairly small
and ill-equipped Mexican Armed Force.
Regardless of the fact that the United States and Mexico
voice different opinions and take different positions on
regional and bilateral issues, they share a basic commitment
to self determination, democracy, stability and peaceful
political resolution of conflicts. There is no country more
important in terms of across-the-board, across the border
impact on peoples lives. The United States should not treat
Mexico as just another country, but must continuously con-
sult with the Mexican government on issues that affect both
nations and attempt to find solutions compatible to both
nations. Those in the business of making decisions must
learn to appreciate Mexican culture, attitudes and their
decentralized political system before making insulting com-
ments about Mexican political decision-making. Mexico cannot
continue to be treated like just another developing country.




19 73 LAW TO PROMOTE MEXICAN INVESTMENT
AND TO REGULATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
ARTICLE 3
. Foreigners who acquire property of any kind
within the Mexican Republic by so doing agree to be treated
as Mexican nationals regarding the said property and not to
invoke the protection of their own Government in this
respect, under penalty in case of default, of losing to
the Mexican nation the property they may have acquired.
ARTICLE 4
.
The following activities are reserved exclusively
for the State:
a) Petroleum and other hydrocarbons
b) Basic petrochemicals
c) Exploitation of radio-active minerals and the generation
of nuclear energy




g) Telegraphic and radio-telegraphic communications and
h) All others as established by specific laws.
The following activities are reserved exclusively for Mexicans
or for Mexican companies which exclude foreigners:
a) Radio and television
b) Automotive transportation, whether urban, interurban or
on Federal highways
c) National air and sea transportation
d) Forestry exploitation
e) Gas distribution and
f) All others as set out by the specific laws or by the
rules issued by the Federal Executive.
ARTICLE 5 . In the following activities or companies, foreign
investment in the capital will be permitted in the propor-
tions indicated:
a) Exploitation and utilization of mineral substances:
Concessions may not be granted or assigned to foreign
individuals or companies. In companies devoted to this
activity, foreign investment may take part up to a
maximum of 49% where the exploitation and utilization of
substances subject to ordinary concessions are concerned
and up to a maximum of 34% where special concessions for
the exploitation of national mineral reserves are concerned
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b) By-products of the petrochemical industry: 40%
c) The manufacture of components for automotive vehicles:
4 0% and
d) Those indicated by specific laws or rules issued by the
Federal Executive.
In cases where the legal dispositions or rules do not stipu-
late a certain percentage, foreign investment may partici-
pate in a proportion not exceeding 49% of the companies'
capital, provided that foreigners do not have the right
in any capacity to manage the company.
The National Foreign Investment Commission may pass decisions
on the increase or reduction of the percentage to which the
preceding paragraph refers, when in their opinion it is
advantageous for the economy of this country, and they may
set the conditions according to which foreign capital will
be admitted, in specific cases.
The participation of foreign investment in the administra-
tion agencies of the company may not exceed its participation
in the capital.
When there are laws or legal rules in existence for a certain
line of activity, foreign investment must be adjusted to the
percentage and conditions indicated in the said laws or
rules
.
ARTICLE 12 . The National Foreign Investment Commission shall
be empowered as follows:
I. To decide according to Article 5 of this law, on the
increase or reduction of the percentage of foreign investment
which may take part in the different geographical areas or ,
different fields of economic activity in the country when
there are no existing legal dispositions or rules to set
the percentage or to determine the conditions under which the
said investment may be received.
II. To decide upon the percentage and conditions according
to which foreign investment may be admitted in those certain
cases which, because of the special circumstances under which
they fall, merit special treatment.
III. To decide on the foreign investment permissible in
companies already established in Mexico or in those which
are new.
IV. To decide on the proportion of existing foreign invest-
ment in Mexico to be admitted in new fields of economic
investment or in new production lines.
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V. To be a compulsory consultation agency on matters of
foreign investment for the departments of the Federal
Executive, decentralized agencies, companies with state
participation, trust institutions of the trusteeships" estab-
lished by the Federal Government or by the state governments
and for the National Securities Commission.
VI. To establish the criteria and requisites for the appli-
cation of the legal dispositions and rules on foreign invest-
ment.
VII. To coordinate the activities of the departments of the
Federal Executive, decentralized agenceis and companies with
state participation for the fulfillment of their functions
in matters of foreign investment.
VIII. To submit for the consideration of the Federal Execu-
tive planned legislation and rules as well as administrative
measures on matters of foreign investment.
IX. All others as authorised by this law.
ARTICLE 13 . In order to decide on the advantage of authorizing
foreign investment and to determine the percentage and condi-
tions under which it will be admitted, the Commission will
take into consideration the following criteria and character-
istics of the investment:
I. If it is complementary to national investment.
II. If it does not displace national companies now is
it directed to fields of activity adequately covered by
them.
III. If its effects on the balance of payments will be
positive and in particular on the increase in exports.
IV. Its effects on employment, the level of employment it
will generate and how much the labourers will be paid.
V. The employment and training of Mexican technicians and
administrative personnel
.
VI. The utilization of Mexican products and parts in the
manufacture of its products
.
VII. The proportion in which its operations are financed
with resources from abroad.
VIII. The diversification of investment sources and the
need to stimulate regional and subregional integration in
the Latin American area.
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IX. Its contribution to the progress of zones and regions
of relatively slower economic development.
X. If it will not occupy a monopolist position in the
national market.
XI. The capital structure of the field of economic activity
under consideration.
XII. Its technological contribution and its share in the
research and technological development of this country.
XIII. Its effects on price levels and production quality.
XIV. If it will maintain the social and cultural values of
this country.
XV. The importance of the activity under consideration,
within the national economy.
XVI. The foreign investor's identification with the inter-
ests of this country and his connections with centers of
economic decision abroad.
XVII. The extent to which, in general, it contributes to
the achievement of and supports the policy of national
development.
SOURCE: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, English
translation of the law published in the Diario Official ,
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